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A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC 
and Private Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers 
abstract .  While proponents of the bonding hypothesis have posited that foreign firms 
crosslist in the United States to signal compliance with the strict U.S. corporate governance 
regime, these scholars have taken the enforcement of U.S. securities laws largely for granted. 
This Note presents an empirical examination of previously unexplored data on the enforcement 
of U.S. securities laws against foreign issuers. The results suggest that relative to domestic 
issuers, foreign issuers in the United States have benefited not only from a more lax set of rules, 
but also from a more forgiving public enforcement agency. At the same time, U.S. courts have 
limited private enforcement against foreign issuers, thus restricting an alternative to public 
enforcement and further widening the gap between the corporate governance regime for U.S. 
issuers and the one for foreign issuers. 
 
author.  Yale Law School, J.D. 2009; Stanford University, M.A., B.A. 2006. I would like to 
thank Roberta Romano for her continued guidance and support. I would also like to thank 
Henry Hansmann, Jonathan Macey, and James Cox for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and 
Scott Hartman and the editors of The Yale Law Journal for significant editorial assistance. All 
errors are my own. 
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In both the scholarly work of the last decade and in recent policymaker 
reports,1 the competitiveness of U.S. financial markets has been evaluated in 
part by their ability to attract foreign companies to raise capital in the United 
States by listing or crosslisting on U.S. exchanges.2 While policymakers have 
advocated reforms to make U.S. markets more attractive to foreign firms, 
scholars have sought to understand exactly what draws foreign issuers to 
crosslist in the United States and how such companies—and their investors—
are affected by the decision to sell securities in the United States. The 
dominant academic explanation of crosslisting has emphasized the “bonding” 
effect of listing on U.S. markets.3 Building on the law and finance literature, 
the proponents of the bonding hypothesis have focused on the effect of legal 
origins, rules, and institutions on crosslisting patterns.4 They have posited that 
 
1.  In the last four years, at least four policy reports have been issued, each responding to some 
variation of the alleged “steady decline in [the U.S.] share of global capital markets activity” 
and the loss of U.S. public market competitiveness compared to global public markets. 
COMM’N ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2007). Claiming that “[f]oreign companies commonly cite the U.S. 
enforcement system as the most important reason why they do not want to list in the U.S. 
market,” the reports have called for a reduction in the intensity of the rules and enforcement 
processes that currently apply to foreign issuers. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, 
INTERIM REPORT 71 (2006); see MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, 
SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007); 
THE FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE, THE BLUEPRINT FOR U.S. FINANCIAL COMPETITIVENESS 
(2007). 
2.  See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 
107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2362-63 (1998) (arguing for the adoption of a “market approach” to 
securities regulation that would eliminate a significant deterrent to listings). 
3.  The term “bonding” was first coined by Jensen and Meckling, who defined it as the costs or 
liabilities that an agent or entrepreneur will incur to assure investors that it will perform as 
promised, thereby enabling it to market its securities at a higher price. See Michael C. Jensen 
& William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
4.  See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997). The 
focus on legal rules became particularly intense after the publication of the seminal law and 
finance paper in 1998. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1115 
(1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance] (examining “empirically how laws 
protecting investors differ across 49 countries, how the quality of enforcement of these laws 
varies, and whether these variations matter for corporate ownership patterns around the 
world”). After Law and Finance was published, hundreds of scholars “joined in [a] search to 
find the hidden legal rules that facilitate financial development,” a process that at times 
“resembled the medieval quest for the philosopher’s stone that could turn lead into gold.” 
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companies from countries with weaker legal regimes and capital markets list 
their shares in the United States to rent a stronger securities law and 
enforcement regime and “leapfrog[] local impediments.”5 By submitting to the 
disclosure requirements and public enforcement powers of the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC), as well as to the private enforcement powers of 
shareholders, foreign companies have been able to credibly subject themselves 
to the stricter legal and regulatory requirements available in the United States, 
and in return, to enjoy higher market valuations and lower costs of capital. 
In much of this research, however, enforcement of the securities laws—an 
important premise of the argument—has been “relegated to status as a given.”6 
Scholars have focused on comparing the substantive doctrinal differences 
between various legal and regulatory regimes, but little attention has been 
devoted to determining whether the securities laws analyzed by scholars are 
being enforced or whether the nominally powerful regulators are doing their 
jobs.7 Although recent scholarship has begun to examine the role of 
enforcement, with the exception of recent research by Kate Litvak,8 much of 
the work has focused on aggregate enforcement trends or country-to-country 
comparisons of general enforcement patterns.9 Since little attention has been 
devoted to studying enforcement patterns for crosslisted firms, the impact of 
the enforcement of securities laws on the crosslisting phenomenon remains 
poorly understood. 
It may be true that on paper, U.S. securities laws are the most stringent in 
the world.10 It may also true that on the whole, “the track record of foreign 
 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 
243 (2007). 
5.  Larry E. Ribstein, Crosslisting and Regulatory Competition, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 97, 98 (2005). 
6.  Donald C. Langevoort, Structuring Securities Regulation in the European Union: Lessons from 
the U.S. Experience, in INVESTOR PROTECTION IN EUROPE: CORPORATE LAW MAKING, THE 
MIFID AND BEYOND 485, 488 (Guido Ferrarini & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 2006). 
7.  See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 244. 
8.  In a very recent working paper, discussed in more detail below, Kate Litvak compares the 
crosslisting premiums for foreign issuers with varying levels of exposure to SEC 
enforcement and U.S. securities litigation. She finds that crosslisting premia “are not 
strongly attached to the level of US regulation.” Kate Litvak, The Relationship Among U.S. 
Securities Laws, Crosslisting Premia, and Trading Volumes 5 (CELS 2009 4th Annual 
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Working Paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443590. 
9.  See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 309 (observing that “the United States pursues securities 
law violations through both public and private enforcement with an intensity unmatched 
elsewhere in the world” and attributing lower cost of capital to this overall intensity). 
10.  See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 1, at 71. 
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enforcement authorities indicates that they are generally less aggressive than 
their counterparts in the United States, and that even the most vigorous ones 
bring fewer cases and impose significantly lower penalties.”11 But what 
happens when one disaggregates the pattern of securities enforcement in the 
United States? Is the U.S. securities regime as strict as the written rules and the 
aggregate statistics would suggest? Is it equally strict for everyone? 
At a time when U.S. regulatory agencies are under intense scrutiny,12 this 
Note seeks to answer these important questions by collecting and analyzing the 
data on the current U.S. regulatory policy and practice for foreign issuers. 
While other works have noted the relative intensity of U.S. public 
enforcement,13 only one paper has considered closely the treatment of foreign 
issuers crosslisted on U.S. exchanges.14 In addition, the enforcement statistics 
provided by the SEC have often been taken as a given, without much attention 
to how the SEC tracks and reports its enforcement efforts.15 This Note uses a 
new, systematic approach to collect recent data on the enforcement of U.S. 
securities law against foreign companies crosslisted on U.S. exchanges. The 
data reveal a notable disparity in the levels of public (SEC) enforcement of 
securities laws against domestic and foreign issuers. 
Meanwhile, private enforcement against foreign issuers—arguably a 
substitute for public enforcement under the bonding hypothesis—has been 
hampered by recent court decisions. Although the exact reach of class-action 
 
11.  Stephen Labaton, Accounting Plan Would Allow Use of Foreign Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 
2008, at A1. 
12.  See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Following Clues the S.E.C. Didn’t, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at 
BU1 (noting “our nation’s broken-down regulatory apparatus”). Following the financial 
crisis, there has been increased academic attention devoted to assessing the future and 
viability of the SEC, including a Virginia Law Review symposium dedicated to such 
questions. In his introduction to the symposium, Joel Seligman notes that “it is indeed 
uncertain whether the Commission will survive to celebrate its 100th anniversary—at least 
in a form familiar to us today.” Joel Seligman, The SEC in a Time of Discontinuity, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 667, 670 (2009). 
13.  See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: 
Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2009). 
14.  Jordan Siegel, Can Foreign Firms Bond Themselves Effectively by Renting U.S. Securities Laws?, 
75 J. FIN. ECON. 319, 324 (2005). 
15.  See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 4, at 261-62 (suggesting that enforcement can be measured “in 
terms of the number of actions brought” and presenting comparisons of the annual number 
of enforcement actions in the United States and the United Kingdom). There is no 
discussion, however, of how each respective agency tracks or reports its enforcement 
actions. Nor does Coffee discuss whether a U.S. enforcement action is comparable to a U.K. 
enforcement action or whether the two can be compared for the purpose of evaluating 
enforcement intensity. 
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litigation against foreign issuers remains uncertain relative to domestic issuers, 
foreign issuers face minimal litigation exposure when crosslisting in the United 
States. Even though securities litigation is most developed in the United States 
and the SEC is the most active securities regulator in the world, the aggregate 
trends mask important disparities. By showing that foreign issuers are in large 
part exempt from both the public and private organs of the strict U.S. 
enforcement regime, this study challenges a basic premise of the bonding 
hypothesis. 
My analysis proceeds in six parts. Part I reviews the scholarly research on 
the motivations for and the benefits of crosslisting in the United States, with a 
particular focus on the mechanics of the bonding hypothesis. It then provides 
an overview of the process by which foreign companies crosslist in the United 
States and of the laws that affect foreign issuers. Part II considers the available 
research on public enforcement and shows that past scholarly work has focused 
on aggregate trends in enforcement but has overlooked important 
characteristics of the U.S. securities regime. Part III turns to the available data 
on public enforcement of U.S. laws against foreign issuers and introduces the 
methodology used in this Note. Part IV presents the results of my analysis, 
discusses the trends in SEC enforcement, and devotes special attention to a 
recent increase in enforcement actions for violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.16 Part V turns to the connection between public and private 
enforcement. It suggests that although private enforcement against foreign 
issuers may be considered a substitute for public enforcement for purposes of 
the bonding hypothesis, recent court decisions have generally restricted private 
class actions against foreign issuers, thus limiting this enforcement alternative. 
Finally, I present conclusions and offer avenues for further research on the 
subject. 
i .  the u.s.  capital markets and the crosslisting 
phenomenon 
A. An Overview 
In 2006, the New York Stock Exchange—the largest equities marketplace 
in the world with a total global market value of approximately $26 trillion17—
 
16.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977). 
17.  Press Release, NYSE Euronext, NYSE Group, Inc. 2006 Highlights (Dec. 29, 2006), 
available at http://www.nyse.com/press/1167392589502.html. 
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included 424 non-U.S. issuers valued at over $10 trillion.18 Likewise, the 
NASDAQ included 275 foreign issuers from all over the world.19 In 2007, the 
NYSE had 394 foreign issuers, while the NASDAQ had 262.20 Such numbers 
stand in stark contrast to the figures from 1990, when just 170 foreign 
companies were listed on the two exchanges combined.21 As Table 1 shows, 
however, since 2001 there has been a decline in the absolute number of foreign 
issuers that choose to crosslist. So too the geographical makeup of foreign 
issuers has changed. For example, Table 2 shows a decline in European issuers 
and an increase in companies incorporated in the Cayman and Marshall 
Islands.22 To understand these crosslisting patterns, one must consider the 
costs and benefits of crosslisting in the United States. The next Section begins 
with an overview of the benefits of crosslisting. It then reviews the regulatory 
requirements—the on-the-book rules—faced by foreign issuers wishing to raise 
capital in the United States. 
 
 
18.  Press Release, NYSE Euronext, NYSE Salutes the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania (Sept. 24, 2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/press/1190629848623.html. 
19.  SEC, INTERNATIONAL REGISTERED AND REPORTING COMPANIES: MARKET SUMMARY 2006, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreignmarketsumm2006.pdf. 
20.  According to the SEC, there were 229 companies on the Global Market and 33 on the Capital 
Market, both of which are NASDAQ markets. See SEC, INTERNATIONAL REGISTERED AND 
REPORTING COMPANIES: MARKET SUMMARY 2007, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
corpfin/internatl/foreignmarketsumm2007.pdf. For more information about the 
organization of NASDAQ, see NASDAQ, Listing Standards and Fees (2009), 
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq_listing_req_fees.pdf. 
21.  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Impact of Crosslistings and Stock Market Competition on International 
Corporate Governance, in GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 437, 442 (Curtis J. 
Milhaupt ed., 2003). 
22.  In May 2008, the SEC’s Chief Accountant reported that approximately two-thirds of 
European companies had deregistered. SEC Official Says Fewer Companies Coming to U.S. 
Markets in Registered Forum, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 777, 778 (May 12, 2008). 
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2000 1310 417 48 360 64 421 
2001 1344 445 45 322 56 476 
2002 1319 451 46 268 55 499 
2003 1232 443 49 247 40 453 
2004 1240 439 60 246 45 450 
2005 1236 429 79 243 49 436 
2006 1145 424 84 231 44 362 
2007 1058 394 84 229 33 318 
2008 1024 379 79 217 31 318 
 
Table 2. 
countries of incorporation, sorted by most u.s. listings in 200824 
 
country 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
Canada 423 451 491 515 497 480 498 503 481 
Israel 83 88 82 86 86 86 90 91 101 
Cayman 
Islands 78 70 43 33 26 13 15 17 17 
United 
Kingdom 44 48 63 88 107 115 134 143 143 
Brazil 36 35 36 40 40 39 39 37 34 
Bermuda 32 32 28 29 28 25 32 32 32 
British Virgin 
Islands 29 21 21 21 21 20 24 26 25 
 
23.  This chart is based solely on SEC lists of International Registered and Reporting 
Companies. See SEC, INTERNATIONAL REGISTERED AND REPORTING COMPANIES, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
24.  Id. 
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Japan 28 28 29 30 31 31 32 30 27 
Marshall 
Islands 26 22 15 10 3 1 1 1 0 
Mexico 25 24 25 36 39 37 37 41 42 
Netherlands 20 22 27 31 34 38 42 43 42 
Chile 15 16 19 20 23 23 24 27 26 
Australia 15 15 24 25 24 29 31 30 32 
Argentina 14 14 15 15 15 15 24 25 22 
Korea 13 14 15 16 13 12 9 8 8 
Germany 13 13 20 20 22 24 28 31 26 
India 13 13 12 12 11 10 11 12 8 
France 12 14 27 30 33 34 38 36 35 
China 11 11 11 12 13 13 12 11 10 
Ireland 8 10 11 12 12 14 15 17 17 
Hong Kong 8 10 13 14 15 12 10 10 9 
South Africa 8 8 9 9 9 9 7 5 5 
Switzerland 7 10 13 15 14 13 14 13 10 
Taiwan 6 6 7 7 7 8 6 5 5 
Luxembourg 5 7 7 10 10 10 11 10 9 
Singapore 5 6 6 6 6 7 6 7 7 
Russia 5 5 5 6 6 5 5 4 4 
Italy 5 5 11 13 11 14 14 14 14 
Spain 5 5 7 8 9 8 7 7 7 
Sweden 3 5 10 13 13 15 18 17 17 
Greece 3 3 3 5 6 6 6 5 5 
Other 26 27 40 49 56 66 79 86 90 
Total 1024 1058 1145 1236 1240 1232 1319 1344 1310 
B. The Bonding Hypothesis 
Much of the research on crosslisting has been driven by two empirical 
observations. First, firms with U.S. crosslistings exhibit a valuation premium 
relative to similar firms without such crosslistings.25 The premium is greater 
 
25.  A valuation premium is typically computed using the valuation ratio known as Tobin’s q, 
which is the ratio of market value to book value of assets. 
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for firms listed on exchanges (as opposed to over-the-counter (OTC) listings 
and private placements) that subject firms to SEC disclosure requirements and 
enforcement.26 It is also greater for firms from countries where investor 
protection is weaker.27 The historical average listing premium between 1990 
and 2001 for foreign firms crosslisting on major U.S. exchanges was 17.5% over 
noncrosslisted firms. Between 2002 and 2005, the premium was 14.3%.28 
Second, foreign firms that crosslist on U.S. exchanges incur a reduction in the 
cost of capital, with scholars pinning the reduction between 50 and 110 basis 
points.29 Thus, firms that crosslist in the United States enjoy greater valuations 
and lower costs of capital than do comparable firms that do not crosslist in the 
United States. 
What accounts for the results described above? And why do some 
companies but not others choose to crosslist on U.S. markets? The proposed 
explanations range widely and are currently being reexamined by scholars,30 
but it is the corporate governance explanation that has persisted in the 
 
26.  See Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Why Are Foreign Firms Listed in the 
U.S. Worth More?, 71 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 206 (2004). 
27.  Id. 
28.  Craig Doidge, G. Andrew Karolyi & René M. Stulz, Has New York Become Less Competitive 
Than London in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign Listing Choices over Time, 91 J. FIN. ECON. 
253, 272 (2009). 
29.  Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, Cost of Capital and Cash Flow Effects of U.S. Crosslistings 18 
(Weiss Ctr. for Int’l Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 05-2, 2005), available at 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/weiss/wpapers/05-2.pdf. 
30.  While the bonding hypothesis has received the most academic attention, numerous 
alternative explanations for crosslisting have been proposed and are once again gaining 
traction in the scholarly literature. Initially, some scholars favored a simpler access-to-capital 
explanation. See Coffee, supra note 21, at 440. Others have emphasized the strategic business 
motivations behind crosslisting. For example, listing on a foreign exchange may improve 
product identification among investors and consumers in the host country. It may increase 
market demand for the firm’s products as well as its securities. Amir N. Licht, Crosslisting 
and Corporate Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 141, 145 (2003). Finally, a 
few scholars have proposed alternative theories of crosslisting related neither to corporate 
governance nor to capital markets. Amir Licht, for example, suggests that the evidence 
instead supports a so-called avoiding hypothesis. Id. at 142. According to Licht, because the 
regulatory regime that is out for rent by foreign issuers differs markedly from the regime 
that applies to domestic issuers, foreign issuers choose to crosslist in the United States to 
avoid the “disinfecting sunlight” of their home countries’ securities laws. Id. at 162. Cally 
Jordan, meanwhile, focuses on crosslisting as a mechanism to overcome the “home bias” of 
U.S. investors. See Cally Jordan, The Chameleon Effect: Beyond the Bonding Hypothesis for 
Crosslisted Securities, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 37, 43 (2006). Most recently, in a new analysis of 
crosslisting premia, Kate Litvak has found support for the “early crosslisting literature,” 
which involves overcoming market segmentation. Litvak, supra note 8, at 15. 
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academic literature through much of the last decade.31 Under the corporate 
governance or bonding explanation of crosslisting, foreign firms that crosslist 
their securities in the United States signal adherence to corporate governance 
standards that are higher than those required by their home countries. As John 
Coffee, a key proponent of the bonding hypothesis, explains: 
Listing on a U.S. exchange has this [bonding] effect because (i) the 
listing firm becomes subject to the enforcement powers of the SEC;  
(ii) investors acquire the ability to exercise effective and low-cost legal 
remedies (such as a class action and the derivative action) that are not 
available in the firm’s home jurisdiction; (iii) the entry into the U.S. 
commits the firm to provide more complete financial information and 
to reconcile its financial statements to U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP); (iv) securities analysts will more closely 
monitor the firm once it crosslists; and (v) institutional investors can 
and do negotiate minority protections if the firm wishes to make an 
initial public offering in the U.S.32 
Public and private enforcement, therefore, are crucial premises of the 
bonding hypothesis. Indeed, Coffee has specifically posited that “the level of 
enforcement intensity . . . distinguishes jurisdictions in a manner that can 
explain national differences in the cost of capital . . . and the valuation 
premium that foreign firms crosslisting into the United States (and only the 
United States) exhibit.”33 As I show in Section II.A, despite the recent focus on 
enforcement, Coffee has examined only the levels of aggregate U.S. public 
enforcement. The key premise of the bonding hypothesis—that foreign issuers 
are subject to the enforcement powers of the SEC—remains largely unexplored. 
 
31.  See Doidge et. al, supra note 28, at 254 (noting that “much of the recent literature on 
crosslistings has emphasized the governance benefit of crosslisting on a major U.S. 
exchange”); see also Ribstein, supra note 5, at 104 (noting that “bonding seems to be the 
dominant explanation for crosslisting”). 
32.  Coffee, supra note 21, at 448 (emphasis added); see also Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj 
Srinivasan, Regulation and Bonding: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of International 
Listings, 46 J. ACCT. RES. 383, 385 (2008) (noting that “[w]hen effective, this bonding 
process creates a commitment to adopt stronger corporate governance practices and credibly 
separates the listing firm from other firms in their home market, resulting in higher market 
valuations and lower costs of capital”). 
33.  Coffee, supra note 4, at 233. 
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C. Crosslisting: Procedural and Substantive Requirements 
What does it mean to be a foreign private issuer in the United States?34 
How do foreign companies tap into the U.S. capital markets, and how do the 
applicable rules compare to those faced by domestic issuers? Although there is 
no general exemption from the U.S. federal securities laws for foreign private 
issuers, the globalization of the securities markets has led the SEC to 
accommodate foreign private issuers in several ways. The following Section 
summarizes the ways that a foreign private issuer can become subject to U.S. 
securities laws as well as the various available exemptions for foreign issuers. A 
brief review of the recent literature on Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)35 also introduces 
the debate about the effects of SOX on crosslisting in the United States. 
1. How Foreign Issuers Become Subject to U.S. Securities Laws 
There are several paths that lead a foreign issuer to the gates of the SEC. 
First, foreign issuers that wish to offer or sell securities to the “public” in the 
United States (that is, to conduct an initial public offering) must comply with 
the registration and reporting requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.36 Such 
an offer or sale requires the filing of a registration statement with the SEC, 
clearance of the registration statement, and the distribution of a prospectus 
that contains extensive business and financial information regarding the issuer. 
Registration of a public offering under the Securities Act subjects the foreign 
issuer to the periodic reporting requirements of the Exchange Act. 
Alternatively, those foreign issuers that do not wish to conduct an initial public 
offering in the United States but that do wish to list a class of their securities 
on a U.S. national securities exchange (such as the New York Stock Exchange) 
must also register their securities with the SEC under the terms of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.37 
 
34.  Under both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the term 
“foreign private issuer” refers to any corporation or other organization incorporated or 
organized under the laws of any foreign country. Nevertheless, there is an exception for an 
organization whose shares are more than 50% owned by residents of the United States if: 
the majority of its executive officers or directors are U.S. citizens or residents, more than 
50% of its assets are located in the United States, or its principle place of business is the 
United States. The SEC treats companies that fall within the exception as domestic issuers. 
SEC Rule 3b-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (2008). 
35.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
36.  See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006). 
37.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (2006). 
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Even if a foreign issuer has never registered an offering under the Securities 
Act and has not listed its securities on a U.S. national securities exchange or 
entered the NASDAQ system, it may still have to comply with the registration 
requirements if it accumulates enough U.S. shareholders to require Exchange 
Act registration. The Exchange Act requires registration of a particular class of 
equity security when it is held by at least three hundred record holders resident 
in the United States and the issuer has over $10 million in total assets.38 
Foreign issuers that become subject to the Exchange Act requirements in this 
way, however, may invoke the special foreign private issuer exemption of Rule 
12g3–2(b) and avoid most of the Exchange Act requirements.39 
2. Exceptions and Exemptions for Foreign Issuers 
Three kinds of transactions by foreign issuers do not require registration 
with the SEC. First, under Regulation S, non-U.S. (offshore) securities 
offerings that are not likely to have an impact on the U.S. securities markets are 
not subject to Securities Act registration.40 Foreign issuers that have “no 
substantial U.S. market interest” in their securities may sell their securities in 
offshore transactions with no further conditions.41 
The second major transactional exemption is the so-called private offering 
exemption.42 Sophisticated investors such as insurance companies, investment 
companies, banks, and other institutions may be treated as private  
(non-public) investors that do not need the protection of the Act’s public 
offering registration procedures. An offering confined to such a group—if not 
accompanied by any “general solicitation or general advertising”—need not be 
registered with the SEC. Offering literature in a private offering is still subject 
to the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, but it is not subject to the 
disclosure requirements applicable to a registered public offering and does not 
have to be filed in advance with the SEC. 
Third, purchasers of securities in a private offering may look to safe harbor 
rules of the SEC that lay out exemptions from registration for resales in the 
United States. Most importantly, Rule 144A permits immediate unregistered 
 
38.  SEC Rule 12g3-2(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (2008). 
39.  SEC Rule 12g-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1. 
40.  Regulation S encompasses Rules 901 through 905 of the Securities Act of 1933. See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.901-05. 
41.  17 C.F.R. § 230.903. 
42.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501-08. 
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resales of restricted securities to “qualified institutional buyers.”43 The Rule 
144A market permits foreign issuers to raise capital free of most U.S. securities 
regulation, including liability under the 1933 Act and Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Specifically, the rule provides a safe harbor from the registration requirements 
for resale of “non-fungible” restricted securities to “qualified institutional 
buyers” managing investment portfolios of $100 million or more. In 2002, 
Rule144A offerings totaled $40 billion, or 22% of all the equity raised in the 
United States. Four years later, such offerings had increased to over $160 
billion, representing more than 50% of the equity raised in the United States in 
2006.44 
Finally, if a foreign issuer is required to face Exchange Act registration and 
reporting only because it has acquired a sufficiently large U.S. shareholder base 
(300 U.S. holders of a class of equity security), it has the option of either 
entering the regular Exchange Act registration and reporting system or availing 
itself of the exemption afforded by Exchange Act Rule 12g3-2(b).45 A foreign 
issuer using the Rule 12g3-2(b) exemption is required to furnish to the 
Commission or publish on its website only whatever “material” information—
translated into English—it has made or is required to make public pursuant to 
its home country’s laws or to a non-U.S. stock exchange’s requirements. In 
essence, the foreign issuer must simply make available the materials it is 
required to prepare domestically; it does not, however, have to generate any 
new documents for the SEC. 
3. Substantive Requirements for Foreign Private Issuers Registered with the 
SEC 
Once issuers fall under the registration and reporting requirements of the 
SEC, what kind of rules do they face? It is important to stress that the rules on 
the books are different for foreign private issuers. The United States effectively 
has two securities regulation regimes: one for domestic issuers and another for 
foreign issuers. The latter “cuts corners” on key issues of corporate 
governance.46 As the U.S. Chamber of Commerce observed in an amicus brief, 
“the SEC has recognized that enabling foreign companies to avoid the 
application of U.S. securities law requirements in appropriate circumstances 
 
43.  17 C.F.R. § 230.144A. 
44.  Luigi Zingales, The Future of Securities Regulation 16 (Univ. of Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus., 
Working Paper No. 08-27, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319648. 
45.  17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b), (d). 
46.  See Licht, supra note 30, at 142-43. 
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will make the United States a more attractive forum.”47 As a result of this 
belief, foreign companies are exempt from several important governance 
provisions.48 For example, the SEC relaxes conflict of interest requirements for 
foreign issuers.49 Foreign issuers are also exempt from several duties with 
regard to proxy statements under section 14 of the Exchange Act and short 
sales and short-swing profits by corporate insiders under section 16. 
Furthermore, while U.S. issuers must file interim quarterly reports (10-Qs) 
that contain unaudited financial and other prescribed information, foreign 
private issuers are required to furnish as interim reports only whatever 
information the foreign private issuer has made or is required to make public 
pursuant to its home country’s corporate laws or a non-U.S. stock exchange’s 
requirements.50 Finally, while foreign issuers had previously been required to 
“reconcile” their financial reporting standards with the U.S. generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP), the SEC eliminated the requirement in 2007 
and permitted foreign private issuers to use the International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS), a standard used by more than 100 countries 
around the world.51 
4. Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley 
No discussion of crosslisting requirements can be complete without an 
assessment of SOX, which drew much attention to the U.S. requirements for 
foreign issuers. Passed in haste in the midst of the public outcry following the 
Enron and WorldCom scandals, SOX represented a departure from the 
 
47.  Brief of the Sec. Indus. and Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A., the 
U.S. Council for Int’l Bus., and the Association Française des Entreprises Privées, as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellees at 10, Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 
167 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-0583), available at http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/caselist/ 
issues/securities.htm. 
48.  Licht, supra note 30, at 151-53; see also Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and 
the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1077 (noting that “there 
are two very distinct tiers of investor protection in the United States: a more rigorous 
standard for domestic companies and a less rigorous one for foreign companies”). 
49.  Licht, supra note 30, at 152. 
50.  SEC Rule 13a-16, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-16 (2008); Form 6-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.306. 
51.  See Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes Roadmap Toward Global Accounting Standards to 
Help Investors Compare Financial Information More Easily, Aug. 27, 2008, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-184.htm (noting that “more than 100 countries 
around the world, including all of Europe, currently require or permit IFRS reporting”); 
Press Release, SEC, SEC Takes Action to Improve Consistency of Disclosure to U.S. 
Investors in Foreign Companies, Nov. 15, 2007, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2007/2007-235.htm. 
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disclosure-oriented mode of regulation and included mandates regarding audit 
committee composition and functioning, forfeiture of CEO incentive 
compensation upon issuance of an accounting restatement, and prohibitions on 
executive loans and the purchase of non-audit services from auditors.52 SOX 
did not exempt foreign private issuers from its requirements, but it did give the 
SEC power to carve out exemptions that could be used to accommodate the 
practices of foreign companies. Although SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt stated in 
2002 that the Act “applies equally to all who seek to access U.S. capital 
markets,”53 the SEC has tailored some of the rules to the special circumstances 
of foreign private issuers. For example, the Commission has made 
modifications to the independence requirements under SOX section 301.54 
Smaller foreign issuers, along with smaller domestic companies, also benefited 
from an extended the compliance deadline for the internal control 
requirements under SOX section 404.55 
Nevertheless, SOX has been blamed repeatedly for imposing 
disproportionate costs on smaller companies and non-U.S. issuers and thus 
undermining the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. While the increased 
compliance costs cannot be disputed, the link between SOX and U.S. capital 
market competitiveness has been the subject of much academic debate. Despite 
policymakers’ attempts to link the burdens of SOX to the decrease in new 
foreign listings, the increase in deregistrations,56 the decline in IPOs, and the 
increase in going-private transactions, scholars have disagreed about the 
relative impact of SOX, particularly given the rapid development of other 
capital markets.57 Most importantly, as with other U.S. securities laws, 
 
52.  See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 
114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
53.  Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC, A Single Capital Market in Europe: Challenges for Global 
Companies, Remarks at the Conference of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
England and Wales (Oct. 10, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
spch589.htm. 
54.  Foreign private issuers did not need to provide an auditor’s attestation on internal controls 
over financial reporting until they filed their annual reports for fiscal years ending on or 
after July 15, 2007. 
55.  The final deadline for compliance with the section 404 management report requirements 
was also delayed until 2007. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Offers Further Relief from section 
404 Compliance for Smaller Public Companies and Many Foreign Private Issuers (Aug. 9, 
2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-136.htm. 
56.  See Piotroski & Srinivasan, supra note 32, at 393-94 (“96 foreign firms deregistered with the 
SEC in 2002–2005 while only 22 firms deregistered in all the years from 1990 to 2001.”). 
57.  On the one hand, Kate Litvak has shown that foreign firms listed in the United States 
experienced a significant negative price reaction to news that SOX would apply to them. 
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although the requirements seem burdensome on paper, no research to date has 
analyzed whether those foreign issuers actually comply with the requirements 
of SOX, and whether the SEC sanctions them if they do not. 
i i .  public enforcement against foreign issuers 
Having outlined the substantive law above, I now turn to the scholarly 
findings about the enforcement of those rules. I begin by tracing the path of 
the law and finance scholarship as it relates to crosslisting, noting both the 
gradual turn toward the study of enforcement and the current focus on 
aggregate patterns and inter-country comparisons. Next, I examine the 
empirical work on public—namely, SEC—enforcement of U.S. securities laws. 
While several works have examined SEC enforcement patterns, only one study 
to date has tracked SEC actions against non-U.S. issuers. 
A. Scholarship on Public Enforcement 
As noted in the introduction, the scholarship on crosslisting builds on the 
law and finance literature. Since the publication of Law and Finance—arguably 
the seminal paper that drew attention to the relationship between a country’s 
“legal origins” and the development of its financial markets58—hundreds of 
studies about the connection between a country’s institutional framework and 
its financial markets have followed. Numerous legal and regulatory 
independent variables have been analyzed as potential causes of market growth 
and development. Such studies have referred vaguely and interchangeably to 
the “U.S. regulatory environment,”59 or the “securities regulation and 
 
Kate Litvak, The Long-Term Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Crosslisting Premia, 14 EUR. 
FIN. MGMT. 875 (2008). On the other hand, Doidge and co-authors contend that the  
post-SOX decline in United States listings relative to U.K. listings has not been due to SOX. 
Instead, the increase in U.K. listings consists of smaller, riskier firms listing on London’s 
Alternative Investment Market, firms that would not be able to list on the NYSE. Doidge, 
Karolyi & Stulz, supra note 28. Still others like Piotroski and Srinivasan have found that the 
probability of small firms listing in the U.S. declined post-SOX, while large firms’ choices 
remained the same. Piotroski & Srinivasan, supra note 32, at 410-12. Notably, Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz examine only large firms, whereas Piotroski and Srinivasan examine the 
listing patters of both large and small foreign firms. 
58.  See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 4. 
59.  Craig Doidge, U.S. Crosslistings and the Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from Dual-Class 
Firms, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 519, 524 (2004). 
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supporting legal institutions,”60 or the “well-functioning corporate governance 
system,”61 as potential explanatory variables of U.S. capital market growth. 
Although numerous governance indices measuring disclosure requirements, 
liability standards, and public enforcement were constructed, all of the indices 
were based on the laws, procedures, and powers on the books. Few attempts 
were made to measure the “use” of the available institutional mechanisms. 
It is precisely this long-standing focus on laws on the books that led 
scholars such as Mark Roe, Howell Jackson, and John Coffee to conclude that 
an approach that focused solely on the formal characteristics of the regulatory 
bodies was inadequate. The simple measurement of “potential powers” ignored 
the “lazy, corrupt, or incompetent regulator who has broad formal powers but 
does nothing in fact.”62 The more satisfactory approach to measuring 
enforcement was to focus on inputs and outputs: on what the regulatory 
agency spent and on what it actually did in a given period of time relative to its 
counterparts abroad. 
According to Coffee, even a preliminary analysis of enforcement statistics 
reveals a striking difference between the U.S. enforcement regime and that of 
other countries. Although the United States does not spend more on 
“regulatory inputs” relative to the size of its capital market, it produces 
considerably more public enforcement “outputs” than its competitors do. For 
example, between 2000 and 2004, the United States brought an average of 224 
public enforcement actions per trillion dollars of 2004 market capitalization, 
while the United Kingdom brought twenty-five.63 In the period between 2000 
and 2002, the public securities enforcement monetary sanctions imposed in the 
United States exceeded those imposed in the United Kingdom, even after 
adjusting for relative market size, by a margin of nearly ten to one.64 In 2005, 
the SEC initiated 629 enforcement actions and imposed $1.8 billion in 
penalties (or $108,959 per billion dollars of stock market capitalization), while 
the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) initiated 269 
enforcement actions and imposed approximately $30 million in penalties (or 
$9,916 per billion dollars of stock market capitalization).65 More recently, 
 
60.  Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz, International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: Do Legal 
Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 485, 486 (2006). 
61.  Licht, supra note 30, at 141. 
62.  Coffee, supra note 4, at 250. 
63.  Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and 
Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 283 (2007). 
64.  Coffee, supra note 4, at 272. 
65.  Id. at 262, 269-72. 
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Coffee and Sale found that the ratio of SEC to FSA penalties and financial 
restitution was “probably around 100 to 1.”66 
Although such statistics seem to suggest that the United States is an 
enforcement outlier, it is important to emphasize that they are premised on 
some key assumptions about the meaning of an “enforcement action.” Without 
further investigation, one cannot be sure whether the 629 SEC enforcement 
actions relate to violations of securities laws by six hundred or just sixty 
different firms and individuals.67 Moreover, such statistics reveal little about 
the nature of the enforcement process or the targets of the enforcement actions. 
Still, certain scholars have interpreted the alleged intensity of U.S. (public) 
enforcement as the source of the crosslisting premium.68 Given both the 
historical salience of the bonding hypothesis, and the emergence of new 
scholarship finding that “we know less than we thought we knew about the 
sources of premia,” a closer look at U.S. public enforcement for foreign issuers 
is particularly timely.69 
B. SEC Enforcement: Previous Empirical Findings 
Despite the growing focus on macroeconomic and comparative studies of 
enforcement, little scholarly attention has been devoted to the analysis of SEC 
enforcement actions over time. A 2008 empirical study tracks SEC enforcement 
actions for financial misrepresentation from 1978 to 2002 and finds that “huge” 
reputational market penalties follow any legal penalties, but it does not analyze 
the national origins of the firms targeted by the SEC and the Department of 
Justice (DOJ).70 The study does, however, note that, on average, the annual 
number of enforcement actions for books and records and internal controls 
misrepresentation represents only 0.32% of all firms listed with the Center for 
 
66.  John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better 
Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 729 (2009) (“Thus, comparing the SEC to its most closely 
comparable regulator, the FSA, the ratio in recoveries seems to be nearly 300 to 1 in 2007 
and probably around 100 to 1 for most recent years.”). 
67.  As discussed below, the SEC often reports multiple “actions” related to the settlement of a 
case against one individual or firm. Similarly, wrongdoing at just one company may 
generate many separate enforcement actions against various employees and related parties, 
which, depending on the nature of the investigation and settlement processes, may be 
reported as individual actions or grouped into one reported enforcement action. 
68.  See supra Section I.B. 
69.  Litvak analyzes the crosslisting premium and presents results that “tend to weaken bonding 
theories of the source of crosslisting premia.” Litvak, supra note 8, at 16. 
70.  Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the 
Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581 (2008). 
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Research in Security Prices (CRSP).71 Furthermore, Karpoff and his colleagues 
observe the number of firms identified by the SEC as having engaged in 
misconduct constitutes a “sizeable fraction” of all firms that restate earnings, 
which suggests that “the probability of getting caught for financial 
misrepresentation is not negligible.”72 Again, this is an aggregate finding; it 
says nothing about whether the conclusion would hold if the data set were 
limited to the universe of crosslisted foreign firms. 
The findings of the Karpoff study are generally in line with those of James 
Cox and Randall Thomas, who have studied SEC “enforcement heuristics” and 
the relationship between SEC enforcement actions and private securities class 
actions.73 Both the Karpoff study and the Cox and Thomas study emphasize 
the importance of legislation—and in particular, the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977 and the Security Enforcement and Penny Stock Reform Act of 
1990—in increasing the range and flexibility of SEC enforcement 
mechanisms.74 However, while Karpoff and his colleagues stress the powerful 
secondary effects of SEC actions, Cox and Thomas focus on the allocation of 
the limited resources of the organization. While the number of filings increased 
by sixty percent between 1991 and 2000, the proportion of filings receiving 
review declined from twenty-one percent to eight percent. In 2001, the SEC 
completed full review of only sixteen percent of issuers, missing its stated goal 
by half.75 
While the aggregate data on overall SEC enforcement patterns reveals 
missed agency goals, the single empirical study on specific treatment of foreign 
firms suggests that the SEC has rarely taken action against crosslisted firms or 
their insiders for violations of the federal securities laws, even when  
well-publicized misconduct has taken place.76 According to Jordan Siegel’s 
study, in the seven-and-a-half year period between January 1, 1995 and June 
30, 2002, the SEC took legal action against only thirteen crosslisted foreign 
 
71.  Id. at 585. The CRSP includes common stock issues, certificates, and ADRSs listed on the 
NYSE, Alternext (formerly AMEX), NASDAQ, and ARCA exchanges. 
72.  Id. at 586. 
73.  James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 
DUKE L.J. 737 (2003). 
74.  Securities Law Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-429, 104 Stat. 931; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 
1494. Prior to the passage of these acts, and particularly before 1978, the SEC’s ability to 
prosecute fraudulent reporting cases was limited to injunctive actions in federal court or 
administrative actions requiring the registrant to correct its filings. 
75.  Cox & Thomas, supra note 73, at 757. 
76.  Siegel, supra note 14, at 335-43. 
SHNITSER_PRESS_V2WEB.DOC 5/28/2010 6:02:50 PM 
a free pass for foreign firms? 
1659 
 
firms.77 Despite the “widespread asset taking during this period,” Siegel notes 
that the SEC did not take a single action against crosslisted firms domiciled in 
Mexico, South Korea, Brazil, or Russia.78 In numerous instances where he was 
able to use newspaper reports and domestic prosecutions to verify wrongdoing 
by Mexican firms, the SEC did not bring any actions to protect investors. 
Furthermore, Siegel observes that the SEC did not often succeed in prosecuting 
the small number of foreign insiders that it did pursue.79 
While the Siegel data are striking, I argue that a more comprehensive 
assessment of the recent data is necessary. First, it is important to consider not 
only the absolute number of enforcement actions against foreign issuers but 
also the rates at which foreign companies have been targeted and the baseline 
rates for domestic issuers. Second, while the annual total of “SEC enforcement 
actions” is frequently cited,80 the meaning of this number deserves greater 
scholarly attention. Third, securities regulation has changed dramatically since 
2002, most notably with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.81 Finally, the 
recent focus on crosslisting and the concern about the competitiveness of U.S. 
capital markets82 suggest that an examination of SEC enforcement statistics 
between 2002 and 2008 is particularly timely. 
C. SEC Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers: Theoretical Expectations 
Before delving into the details of the empirical study, it is important to set 
out theoretical predictions for the results. First, although it is difficult to verify 
empirically, there is no a priori reason to expect that foreign issuers are any less 
 
77.  Id. at 342. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. 
80.  See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2008 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 36  
(2009) [hereinafter PWC, 2008 STUDY], available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/ 
NY-09-0894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20 STUDY%20FINAL.PDF; Coffee & Sale, supra 
note 66;  Part I: SEC Enforcement Trends, 2009: Calls for Reform and Their Background, SEC 
Actions, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.secactions.com/?p=871; see also The Perils of Pledging, 
TheCorporateCounsel.net, Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/ 
archive/001943.html (noting the “impressive numbers” released by the SEC). 
81.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
82.  According to Doidge and his colleagues, in 1998 the major New York exchanges “collectively 
attracted 30% of all the foreign listings in the world; the London Stock Exchange’s (LSE) 
Main Market and Alternative Investment Market (AIM) had 16% . . . . It is now almost 
conventional wisdom . . . that London has become more competitive in attracting foreign 
listings than New York.” Doidge et al., supra note 28, at 253-54. 
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prone to violations of U.S. securities laws than domestic issuers. Prior work 
has noted that foreign issuers are more likely to have concentrated ownership 
and, in turn, higher private benefits of control.83 According to Doidge et al., 
“all else equal, the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders will be 
highest when managers’ control of a firm cannot be challenged internally.”84 In 
addition, particularly in the 1990s, many foreign firms that crosslisted in the 
United States came from emerging market economies where corporate 
governance rules were weaker than and much different from the governance 
rules in the United States.85 
Second, one might reasonably expect the SEC to devote less attention, on 
average, to foreign cases. Because the resources of the SEC are so limited, the 
agency must set priorities for the types of enforcement matters that it will 
pursue. As the SEC’s Director of Financial Markets and Community 
Investment stated in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight 
of Government Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia: 
[The] SEC generally prioritizes the cases in terms of (1) the message 
delivered to the industry and public about the reach of SEC’s 
enforcement efforts, (2) the amount of investor harm done, (3) the 
deterrent value of the action, and (4) SEC’s visibility in certain areas 
such as insider trading and financial fraud.86 
These goals form a useful set of criteria for a theoretical consideration of 
the appropriate level of enforcement for foreign issuers. Indeed, the lack of 
enforcement actions may reflect a delicate balancing of considerations of the 
investor harm (perhaps mostly to non-U.S. investors) and the 
deterrent/visibility value of any actions against foreign issuers. Langevoort’s 
“home bias” hypothesis posits that scarce regulatory resources are expended in 
a discriminatory way, with disproportionately fewer resources allocated to 
 
83.  Id. at 255 (“The typical foreign firm has a controlling shareholder and comes from a country 
where controlling shareholders have more of an opportunity to make themselves better off 
at the expense of minority shareholders compared with the US.” (citation omitted)). 
84.  Craig Doidge et al., Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Crosslisting Decision, 64 J. 
FIN. 425, 432 (2009). 
85.  Coffee, supra note 21, at 444. 
86.  Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at SEC and Key Trade Agencies: Hearing 
Before the S. Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt., Restructuring & the Dist. of Columbia, 
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) [hereinafter Human Capital Hearing] 
(statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director of Financial Markets and Community 
Investment, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office and Loren Yager, Director of International Affairs 
and Trade, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office). 
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extraterritorial enforcement.87 The home bias stems from the higher costs of 
enforcement against foreign issuers: it is more expensive to identify and bring 
enforcement actions when the subjects are located outside the United States. 
There are additional costs in the form of lost control over (and credit for) the 
work that stems from cooperation with foreign authorities. Such “control” 
costs are particularly hard for large bureaucracies to bear. 
The benefits also weigh in favor of domestic issues: in domestic cases, more 
of the victims, or the beneficiaries of SEC actions are U.S. residents. Neglecting 
to pursue fraud on domestic turf would suggest that “the U.S. cannot even 
keep its own house in order.”88 Domestic issues are more visible, and in an 
agency culture that “feeds on salient accomplishments,” this has generally 
meant a preference for well-publicized enforcement actions against domestic 
violators of securities laws.89 The cost-benefit analysis proposed by Langevoort 
thus suggests that the SEC should be willing to take on foreign issuers if either 
the publicity benefits are high or the costs of enforcement are low. Langevoort 
laments the “limited body of empirical evidence” on this subject.90 While 
recent empirical work has corroborated the existence of strategic calculus 
behind SEC enforcement decisions in the case of broker-dealers,91 analysis of 
the agency’s policies toward foreign issuers remains scant. 
i i i .  data and empirical methodology 
Although much has been written about the SEC, no study to date has used 
a systematic approach to assemble a list of foreign private issuers targeted by 
public enforcement actions in the United States.92 Siegel’s approach,93 while 
 
87.  Langevoort, supra note 6, at 487. 
88.  Id. at 499. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. at 487. 
91.  A recent paper presents evidence of strategic calculus by SEC regulators. Notably, in his 
empirical investigation of SEC enforcement actions against broker-dealers, Stavros Gadinis 
finds that SEC officials may adjust enforcement measures on the basis of the target’s 
desirability as a potential employer. Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: 
Evidence from Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. 
& Bus., Discussion Paper No. 27, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1333717. 
92.  For example, like many other consulting and auditing firms, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) publishes annual reports about the state of securities litigation in the United States. 
While mainly focused on trends in class action litigation, these reports frequently address 
new laws and trends that affect PwC’s foreign clients, many of whom crosslist on U.S. 
markets. In four reports (2004-2007), PwC has included a tally of the number of foreign 
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impressive for its combination of document review and attorney interviews, 
does not begin with a list of foreign issuers. Because he does not begin with the 
universe of potential targets, Siegel cannot definitively identify which of those 
issuers have been targeted by SEC enforcement actions. A preliminary review 
of SEC enforcement releases suggests that there is no foolproof way to search 
for actions against crosslisted firms, as no one keyword or term is used 
consistently to identify foreign private issuers in SEC enforcement actions. 
Similarly, while the interviews with securities lawyers are undoubtedly useful, 
they may also result in an unsystematic search process. 
In contrast, my methodology includes a two-part assessment of SEC 
enforcement against foreign issuers. As discussed below, the first part begins 
with a list of foreign issuers registered with the SEC between 2000 and 2008 
and uses a systematic approach to check whether there has been an 
enforcement action against any such issuer in those years. The second part 
begins instead with a list of all SEC enforcement actions reported between 
2000 and 2008 for violations of disclosure requirements and checks whether 
any of those actions targeted foreign issuers. The details of each approach are 
discussed in turn below. 
 
issuers targeted by SEC enforcement actions. However, PwC does not explain its 
methodology for identifying such actions and includes actions against foreign companies 
that are not technically foreign private issuers as defined by the SEC. Moreover, it excludes 
certain administrative actions (such as actions for delinquent filings) that are not very costly 
to foreign companies but that are important for the purposes of this analysis. See, e.g., 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2007 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 59 (2008)  
[hereinafter PWC, 2007 STUDY], available at http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/ 
2007%20SECURITY%20LIT%20STUDY%20W-LT.PDF. 
93.  Siegel describes his approach as follows: 
To determine the SEC’s record, I first search all SEC litigation releases between 
January 1, 1995 and June 30, 2002 for actions taken against crosslisted firms. I 
then interview 116 plaintiffs’ attorneys in 2002 to crosscheck and identify any 
remaining SEC enforcement actions. The attorneys interviewed represented the 
most active in the area of securities law and represented all major offices of all 
prominent law firms in this area. Several of the attorneys had 30 years of 
experience and had personal involvement in the earliest cases. As a further check, 
I search both Lexis and the entire SEC web site (including administrative 
proceedings) by the names of all companies ever targeted by private plaintiffs. 
Siegel, supra note 14, at 342. 
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A. Part 1: Search for Enforcement Actions Against Companies on the SEC’s Lists 
of International Registered and Reporting Issuers 
The starting point for this part of the study is the SEC’s database of 
International Registered and Reporting (IRR) companies.94 The annual lists 
are available for 2000-2008.95 According to the SEC’s Office of International 
Corporate Finance, with the exception of certain Canadian issuers, these lists 
generally include only foreign private issuers.96 Under the definition of 
“foreign private issuer,”97 companies that are incorporated in foreign 
jurisdictions but have more than fifty percent of their outstanding voting 
securities held by U.S. residents and more than fifty percent of their assets 
located in the United States, are generally treated as U.S. domestic issuers and 
thus excluded from the SEC lists. Thus, the bulk of the issuers on the 
International Registered and Reporting lists are foreign private issuers that file 
the standard foreign private issuer disclosure materials with the SEC.98 
However, the lists also contain a small number of foreign private issuers that 
nevertheless choose to file U.S. domestic disclosure documents. 99 
 
94.  SEC, International Registered and Reporting Companies, http://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
95.  I contacted the SEC to ask for earlier lists but was told that electronic copies are not 
available. I was not able to find the earlier lists on Lexis or Westlaw. 
96.  Telephone Interview with Paul Dudek, Chief of Office of Int’l Corp. Fin., SEC (Dec. 9, 
2009). 
97.  See supra note 34. 
98.  Standard foreign private issuer disclosure documents include 20Fs (annual and transition 
report of foreign private issuers) and 6Ks (current report of foreign issuer). In contrast, 
domestic issuers typically file 10-Ks (annual reports) and 10-Qs (quarterly reports). See 
SEC, Index to Forms, http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/forms/edgform.pdf (last visited Feb. 
2, 2010). 
99.  In short, there are two exceptions to the general rule that the International Registered and 
Reporting issuer lists include only foreign private issuers that file FPI disclosure materials. 
First, the lists include certain Canadian issuers that may or may not be foreign private 
issuers and that file domestic issuer forms with the SEC. Second, certain foreign private 
issuers from the Cayman Islands, the Marshall Islands and the British Virgin Islands also 
file domestic forms. In order to understand how many issuers on the list of International 
Registered and Reporting Companies file domestic forms, I used the Edgar database to 
check the disclosure materials filed by each of the 1259 issuers from Canada, the Cayman 
Islands, the Marshall Islands and the British Virgin Islands on the aggregate 2000-2008 list. 
Although Edgar did not have sufficient information for all of the companies on the list, of 
the 1229 such issuers for which information was available, I identified 166 (or 13.5%) that 
had filed domestic forms. See SEC, Searching Company Filings, http://sec.gov/search/ 
search.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
SHNITSER_PRESS_V2WEB.DOC 5/28/2010 6:02:50 PM 
the yale law journal 119:1638  2010  
1664 
 
From the nine annual IRR lists, I generated a list of 2476 unique company 
entries. The lists represent foreign issuers that had been registered with the 
SEC between 2000 and 2008. The next key step was to search SEC records to 
determine whether the Commission had brought enforcement actions against 
any of the companies. For this task, I used the SEC’s search engine,100 which 
permits users to search all Commission documents, including administrative 
and litigation releases. I reviewed all the results to isolate those enforcement 
actions that involved any enforcement measures against foreign issuers.101 I 
included actions that involved as defendants the foreign issuer, its 
subsidiary,102 or the employees of either the parent or the subsidiary. I did not 
include actions against third parties for wrongdoing involving the foreign 
issuer, such as instances of insider trading by third parties (non-employees) in 
the stock of a foreign issuer. 
For each remaining company/action entry on my list,103 I used the 
enforcement releases and the annual SEC reports to identify: (1) the fiscal year 
of the enforcement action;104 (2) the country of incorporation of the foreign 
issuer; (3) the market on which the securities of the foreign issuer were traded; 
(4) the enforcement category, as identified by the SEC;105 (5) whether the 
 
100.  SEC, Search SEC documents (Advanced Search), http://search.sec.gov/secgov/index.jsp 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
101.  The database search generated results for companies listed in litigation documents because 
they were, for example, involved in certain transactions with other U.S. defendants. 
102.  In evaluating whether or not to include actions against subsidiaries of FPIs, I had to evaluate 
the involvement of the FPI in the case. I did not include enforcement actions in which the 
FPI was merely identified as a corporate parent of the defendant. In particular, I did not 
include a number of such cases in the Broker Dealer and Investment Advisor enforcement 
categories, see infra note 105, since they generally involved misconduct by U.S. incorporated 
financial institutions and did not reference any wrongdoing or liability by the foreign 
parent. 
103.  The list generated by this methodology contains an entry for each time a foreign issuer 
(including its employees and subsidiaries) was named as a defendant in an SEC 
enforcement action. Thus, if an employee of a foreign issuer was named in two separate 
actions, there would be a separate entry for each unique enforcement action. Similarly, in 
rare instances where multiple foreign issuers were named as defendants in a single action, I 
included an entry for each foreign issuer affected by the enforcement action. 
104.  The SEC classifies enforcement actions by fiscal year, and hence, I follow this practice as 
well. The fiscal year begins on October 1st and ends on September 30th. See, e.g., SEC, 
SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA, FISCAL 2008 (2009), available at http://sec.gov/about/ 
secstats2008.pdf 
105.  The SEC generally classifies enforcement actions into one of the following categories: Issuer 
Reporting and Disclosure, Broker Dealer, Investment Advisors, Securities Offering Cases, 
Delinquent Filings, Insider Trading Cases, Market Manipulation, Civil Contempt, 
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enforcement action was classified in SEC reports as primarily an administrative 
or a civil action; 6) whether the action was against the issuer (or its employees) 
or against a subsidiary (or its employees);106 and 7) whether the issuer filed 
FPI disclosure materials.107 
To assess the merits of my methodology, I compared my list to the lists 
generated by PricewaterhouseCoopers and by Siegel.108 As an additional check, 
I reviewed a Shearman & Sterling LLP report on the enforcement of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).109 As scholars and practitioners have 
observed, in the last couple of years the SEC has drastically increased the 
prosecution of FCPA cases and several large foreign private issuers have been 
the targets of increased SEC enforcement.110 
 
Municipal Offering, Transfer Agent, Investment Companies, or Miscellaneous Cases. See id. 
3 tbl.2.  
106.  Hence, not all actions on my list included foreign issuers as named defendants. Including 
actions against the employees and subsidiaries of foreign issuers reflects the attempt to 
define enforcement against foreign issuers broadly, as proponents of the bonding hypothesis 
would likely argue that a narrower measure would underestimate the scope and 
effectiveness of U.S. public enforcement. 
107.  Since the IRR lists did include a small subset of issuers that did not file typical foreign issuer 
disclosure documents, the goal of this check was to identify companies that filed as domestic 
issuers (and hence provided more disclosure to the SEC). 
108.  See supra note 92 and accompanying text; Siegel, supra note 14. Several of the companies on 
the PwC lists were not on the SEC IRR lists. Foreign companies that are not foreign private 
issuers must meet the same registration and disclosure requirements as U.S. firms, and one 
would not expect that they would be treated differently by the SEC (or at least one would 
expect that the difference in treatment would be much smaller). Meanwhile other 
companies such as Parmalat S.p.A., also on the PwC list, sold securities only to U.S. 
institutional investors and hence did not have to register with the SEC. In this case, one 
would expect the SEC to treat such companies differently, in large part due to the lack of 
information. Thus, my analysis focuses mainly only on the foreign private issuers that are 
registered with the SEC and that submit disclosure information in the form of Form 20Fs 
and 6Ks. 
109.  SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST OF CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING TO 
BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977 
(2009), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/LT-030509-FCPA-Digest 
-Cases-And-Review-Relating-to%20Bribes-to-Foreign-Officials-under-the-Foreign 
-Corrupt-Practices-Act.pdf [hereinafter SHEARMAN & STERLING, 2009 REPORT]. 
110.  See id. at ii-iv. 
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B. Part 2: In-Depth Review of SEC Enforcement for Issuer Reporting & 
Disclosure Violations 
In addition to checking whether any enforcement actions had been brought 
by the SEC against the issuers on the 2000-2008 IRR lists, I reviewed every 
enforcement action reported in the Issuer Reporting and Disclosure category 
between 2000 and 2008. As Table 3 shows, this category is one of the six 
enforcement categories pursued by the SEC. It represents on average  
twenty-six percent of all SEC enforcement actions, and, insofar as it targets 
issuers for misleading investors and disseminating false information about the 
company, it is arguably the most relevant category for the proponents of the 
bonding hypothesis. 
For each of the 1455 actions in this category that were reported between 
2000 and 2008, I identified the issuer whose wrongdoing was the primary 
concern of the enforcement action.111 Not all actions were against issuers or 
their employees. Approximately fourteen percent of the actions each year in 
this category were against auditors or third parties who aided the issuers in 
violating the securities laws. Thus, for each action in this category, I noted 
whether it was against the issuer whose wrongdoing was the impetus for the 
SEC investigation or against a “third party” that had contributed to the 
wrongdoing. Finally, for any foreign issuer targeted by the SEC, I checked 
whether the issuer was on the IRR lists and, if so, whether it had filed FPI 
disclosure materials. Because the goal of this exercise was to consistently 
identify enforcement against foreign private issuers that acted as such, I 
excluded from the FPI category any foreign issuer that was not on the IRR list 
and any issuer that did not file FPI disclosure documents. 
 
 
111.  For a small number of actions, there was no issuer wrongdoing. That is, the action did not 
pertain to violations of securities laws by a registered issuer. Such cases were excluded from 
the sample. 
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2000 503 103 8 40 48 125 179 
2001 485 112 14 57 40 95 167 
2002 598 163 10 59 42 119 205 
2003 679 199 11 50 32 109 278 
2004 639 179 21 42 39 98 260 
2005 629 185 60 50 46 60 228 
2006 574 138 91 46 27 61 211 
2007 656 219 53 47 36 68 233 
2008 671 157 111 61 52 121 169 
 
The next step in my analysis was to compare enforcement rates. I used 
Compustat to gather information about the total number of domestic issuers 
on U.S. exchanges.113 As a check on Compustat, I contacted the SEC’s Office of 
International Corporate Finance and obtained a ballpark estimate of the total 
number of issuers on the U.S. markets.114 I also referred to the report prepared 
for the SEC by the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, which 
also provided information on the average number of domestic issuers listed on 
U.S. markets.115 
In sum, my methodology included a combination of 1) searches for 
enforcement actions against registered and reporting foreign issuers and 2) the 
 
112.  For 2000 through 2004, this data comes from the SEC annual reports, which are available 
on the SEC’s website at http://sec.gov/about/annrep.shtml. For 2005-2008, the data comes 
from Select SEC and Market Data Reports, which are published at the end of each fiscal year 
and are available on the Commission’s website at http://sec.gov/about.shtml. 
113.  The SEC does not publish the total number of issuers registered and reporting with the 
agency. Compustat is a database that covers approximately ninety-eight percent of the 
world’s market capitalization with data on over 90,000 global securities. September 2009 
Compustat North American data was used to identify all companies in any given year. See 
Compustat, http://www.compustat.com/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
114.  The ballpark number was 12,000, with a possible range between 10,000 to 15,000 issuers. 
Telephone Interview with Paul Dudek, supra note 96. 
115.  SEC, FINAL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES, at E3, 
E11 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf. 
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complete review of all SEC issuer reporting and disclosure enforcement 
actions. As I show below, the former allowed me to analyze trends and patterns 
in the set of all enforcement actions against foreign registered and reporting 
issuers. In contrast, the latter approach facilitated the comparison of 
enforcement rates for domestic and foreign issuers. The second approach also 
shed light on the methodology and meaning of the often cited SEC 
enforcement statistics. 
iv.  empirical results 
A. General Enforcement Trends 
Appendix A provides a list of foreign registered and reporting companies 
that have been subject to SEC enforcement in the United States between 2000 
and 2008.116 As noted above, the list includes certain issuers multiple times if 
multiple actions were reported against that issuer, its subsidiaries or 
employees. For example, since there have been three separate actions involving 
ABB, Ltd., there are three separate entries for that issuer on my list. In the 
section below, I present an overview of the types of cases that have been 
brought against foreign issuers registered and reporting with the SEC. 
First, Table 4 shows that the distribution of jurisdictions of the foreign 
issuers that were targeted by the SEC. Just as Canada has the most foreign 
issuers in the United States (forty percent of all foreign issuers), so too are 
Canadian companies the most common targets of U.S. regulators (twenty-six 
percent of enforcement actions). And just as certain countries (France, 
Germany, Ireland, Japan, and Italy, for example) did not represent a big 
percent of the foreign listing, they likewise didn’t represent a big percent of the 
foreign issuers targeted by the SEC. Notably, however, while Dutch companies 
represent three percent of foreign issuers, they represented sixteen percent of 
actions against foreign targets. Similarly, Swiss companies made up just one 
percent of all foreign issuers, but nine percent of targeted issuers. Seven 
percent of the enforcement actions targeted issuers incorporated in the Cayman 
Islands, even though only three percent of foreign issuers listed on U.S. 
exchanges were incorporated there. Interestingly, Israeli companies made up 
seven percent of foreign issuers, but just two percent of SEC targets, a finding 
that is consistent with the avoiding hypothesis proposed by Amir Licht.117 
 
116.  Of the eighty-six entries on the list, five involve three different Canadian issuers that were 
on the IRR lists but filed domestic disclosure materials. 
117.  Licht, supra note 30. 
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Despite the limitations of the small sample, given the range of countries 
represented, it is reasonable to infer that the SEC does not target issuers from 
any one country. At the same time, it is also plausible that its willingness to 
undertake enforcement against foreign issuers depends at least in part on the 
cooperation of its counterparts in the issuer’s home country, which may 
explain, in part, the greater scope of enforcement actions against certain 
foreign issuers.118 Countries like Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland 
have some of the most active securities regulation regimes and the regimes that 
most closely resemble the U.S. system. While the companies from these 
countries do make up a large segment of foreign issuers, they are also attractive 
targets for a regulator with very limited resources and a great need to 
demonstrate its enforcement powers. 
 
 
118.  The scope of the enforcement actions may be measured, in part, by the number of unique 
enforcement actions related to wrongdoing by a particular issuer. For example, the SEC 
brought at least ten separate actions related to the wrongdoing by the Dutch company Royal 
Ahold and its subsidiaries. 
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percent of all 
foreign listings 
Antigua 1 1.2% 0.1% 
Belgium 2 2.3% 0.2% 
Brazil 3 3.5% 3.1% 
British Virgin Isl 2 2.3% 0.9% 
Canada 22 25.6% 39.6% 
Cayman Islands 6 7.0% 2.8% 
Cyprus 2 2.3% 0.0% 
Denmark 1 1.2% 0.3% 
France 3 3.5% 2.4% 
Germany 2 2.3% 1.8% 
Ireland 2 2.3% 1.1% 
Israel 2 2.3% 7.2% 
Italy 1 1.2% 0.9% 
Japan 1 1.2% 2.4% 
Liberia 1 1.2% 0.4% 
Mexico 5 5.8% 2.8% 
Norway 1 1.2% 0.6% 
Netherlands 14 16.3% 2.7% 
Philippines 1 1.2% 0.3% 
Singapore 1 1.2% 0.5% 
South Africa 1 1.2% 0.6% 
Sweden 1 1.2% 0.9% 
Switzerland 8 9.3% 1.0% 
United Kingdom 3 3.5% 8.1% 
 
Second, the enforcement data can be broken down by the market on which 
foreign issuers choose to list their securities. Table 5 shows that the New York 
Stock Exchange is the venue of choice for thirty-five percent of foreign issuers. 
NYSE-listed foreign issuers, however, represented fifty-seven percent of all 
cases against foreign issuers. Similarly, OTC-listed companies represent  
thirty-four percent of foreign listings and thirty percent enforcement actions. 
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However, there is a stark difference in the kinds of cases that were brought 
against NYSE-listed firms and those listed on the OTC. Of the twenty-five 
actions against OTC firms, twenty were low-cost administrative actions for 
delinquent filings, all brought between 2005 and 2008. In contrast, only two of 
the sixty-seven actions against NYSE listed firms were for delinquent filings. 
 
Table 5. 









percent of all 
foreign listings 
NYSE 47 54.7% 35.0% 
AMEX 2 2.3% 5.3% 
OTC 25 29.1% 34.2% 
NMS/Global 12 14.0% 25.5% 
 
One would expect that NYSE companies are particularly attractive targets 
for the SEC. Additional research on this matter is necessary, but it is clear that 
NYSE companies are bigger and higher-profile targets for the SEC. Although 
previous work has shown that the SEC does not necessarily target only the 
biggest companies,119 it is also true that market impact is one of the criteria that 
the agency uses in deciding which cases to bring.120 If the goal is to make an 
example out of a foreign issuer, then it is very likely that NYSE companies are 
more attractive targets. 
Third, as Table 6 shows, over eighty percent of the enforcement actions 
were in the Issuer Reporting and Disclosure and Delinquent Filings categories, 
arguably the two most important categories for proponents of the bonding 
hypothesis. In addition to the enforcement totals presented in Table 6, the 
enforcement rates for foreign and domestic issuers in these categories are 
explored in detail below. Table 6 also gives the totals for enforcement actions 
in the other SEC enforcement categories (such as insider trading, investment 
advisor and broker dealer), which all contribute to the general integrity of U.S. 
 
119.  E.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 73. 
120.  Human Capital Hearing, supra note 86 (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director of 
Financial Markets and Community Investment, U.S. General Accounting Office and Loren 
Yager, Director of International Affairs and Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office). 
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securities markets.121 However, as Table 6 shows, that there have only been ten 
insider trading enforcement actions against foreign issuers or their employees 
between 2000 and 2008, a strikingly low number given that there have been 
452 such enforcement actions in that time period. Similarly, there were very 




enforcement actions by enforcement category 
 
enforcement category 
number of enforcement 
actions 
percent of enforcement 
actions 
Insider Trading 10 11.6% 
Broker-Dealer 1 1.2% 
Issuer Reporting and 
Disclosure 44 51.2% 
Delinquent Filing: Issuer 
Reporting 25 29.1% 
Investment Advisor 0 0.0% 
Municipal Offering 0 0.0% 
Miscellaneous 2 2.3% 
Securities Offering 1 1.2% 
Investment Company 2 2.3% 
Market Manipulation 1 1.2% 
 
Finally, although the SEC did pursue a number of high-profile cases 
against certain NYSE-listed foreign issuers, approximately sixty-five percent of 
the actions on the list were primarily classified as administrative. Of those, 
twenty-five actions involved sanctions for failure to comply with the 
 
121.  Enforcement rates for these enforcement categories are not presented due to methodological 
challenges. While the Issuer Reporting and Delinquent Issuer cases are typically brought 
against companies and/or their employees for wrongdoing related to those companies, cases 
in these other categories frequently target individuals apart from any issuers. Because 
individuals are targeted apart from companies, it is much harder to determine the universe 
of possible enforcement targets and hence nearly impossible to determine enforcement rates. 
122.  As I point out in note 102, supra, the SEC did bring a number of actions against  
U.S.-incorporated broker-dealers and investment advisors that were owned by foreign 
companies. However, to the extent that the action did not involve the foreign parent or 
suggest any wrongdoing by the foreign issuer, I did not include such actions on my list. 
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registration and filing requirements. In many of the instances, the foreign 
issuers had not filed required documents in more than seven years. For 
example, in a representative 2008 case, the SEC brought an action against a 
company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and also traded on the 
OTC market. The SEC noted that the company had not filed any periodic 
reports since it filed a Form 20-F for the period ending December 31, 2000. 
After the company failed to respond to the agency’s Order Instituting 
Proceedings, the SEC deemed it “necessary and appropriate for the protection 
of investors to revoke the registration” of Getgo and other similarly delinquent 
companies.123 The order against Getgo was part of an order-by-default against 
six different companies. As such, it was clearly a low-cost enforcement action 
for the SEC. One can surmise that the foreign issuers that stopped filing 
required reports wished neither to trade on U.S. markets nor to comply with 
the deregistration procedures. Removing such companies was an important 
housekeeping task; it was not, however, the kind of enforcement action that 
would likely deter fraud or give investors confidence about the soundness of 
U.S. securities regulation. 
B. Issuer Reporting and Disclosure Enforcement: A Comparison of Enforcement 
Rates 
In this section, I turn to the SEC’s enforcement of the reporting and 
disclosure rules. Whereas the previous section offered an overview of the type 
of enforcement actions that the SEC brings against foreign issuers, the 
discussion below takes a more in-depth look at a set of enforcement actions 
brought against issuers for misleading investors. The foundation of the 
analysis is the information in Table 7, including the total number of domestic 
and foreign registered and reporting issuers each year, as well as the total 
number of SEC enforcement actions for reporting violations. It is this 
information—in conjunction with the manual review of 1455 actions—that 
allowed me to calculate and compare the “enforcement rates” discussed below. 
 
 
123.  Order Making Findings and Revoking Registrations by Default, Exchange Act of 1934 
Release No. 57,168, at 3 (Jan. 18, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ 
2008/34-57168.pdf. 
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total number of reported 
sec issuer reporting and 
disclosure enforcement 
actions 
2000 1310 10043 103 
2001 1344 9528 112 
2002 1319 9197 163 
2003 1232 8859 199 
2004 1240 8692 179 
2005 1236 8377 185 
2006 1145 8163 138 
2007 1058 7694 219 
2008 1024 7045 157 
 
Table 8 presents the annual number of enforcement actions for violations 
of disclosure rules by foreign private issuers. Because, as noted above, an 
average of fourteen percent of enforcement actions were against auditors and 
others who aided the issuer in fraudulent conduct, I present two versions of the 
results: one set of numbers that includes actions against third parties and one 
set that includes only actions against the company, its subsidiaries or its 
employees. Although actions against third parties do not punish wrongdoing 
by foreign issuers, they may deter third parties from aiding foreign issuers in 
fraudulent behavior, and as such, may theoretically support the bonding effects 
of a U.S. listing. 
 
 
124.  These numbers were taken from the SEC International Registered and Reporting 
Companies lists, supra note 94. 
125.  These numbers were generated using the Compustat database, supra note 113. While the 
total number of domestic issuers does not appear to be published (or even known by) the 
SEC, to assess the validity of the Compustat numbers, I referred to the Final Report of the 
Advisory Committee on Smaller Companies, supra note 115, at E-11, which cited “9,769 
companies per year from 2000 to the end of the fiscal year 2004 . . . exclud[ing] ADRs.” As 
noted above, Paul Dudek also gave a ballpark number of “12,000” total issuers on U.S. 
markets each year. See supra note 114. 
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against aiders and auditors 
 
excluding enforcement 















2000 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 
2002 1 1 0 0 
2003 4 2 3 2 
2004 6 4 6 4 
2005 16 4 7 4 
2006 12 4 5 3 
2007 12 2 3 2 
2008 12 7 12 7 
 
Table 8 highlights two important trends. First, while enforcement for 
disclosure violations against foreign private issuers has certainly increased in 
recent years, it was negligible for the first few years of the twenty-first century 
and in the period when the bonding hypothesis was developed and 
popularized.126 Second, as Tables 8 and 9 show, the SEC issues multiple 
actions each year for the same incidence of fraud or wrongdoing. For example, 
while there were twelve actions against FPIs in 2006 (including actions against 
aiders and auditors), only four unique companies were targeted. Seven separate 
actions were filed against suppliers who aided in the fraud at Royal Ahold, a 
foreign private issuer. Similarly, based on the numbers in Table 9, 
approximately sixty percent of all enforcement actions against domestic issuers 
target wrongdoing at unique companies. Thus, while it is easy to cite the 
number of SEC enforcement actions, it is also important to recognize that such 
aggregate numbers are entirely dependent on the agency’s reporting practices 
and preferences and may mask the actual number of unique issuers affected. 
 
 
126.  Although this Section focuses only on issuer reporting and disclosure, the general search for 
enforcement actions discussed above revealed only two enforcement actions against a 
registered and reporting company between fiscal years 2000 and 2002. 
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against aiders and auditors 
 
excluding enforcement 

















2000 98 58 88 54 
2001 107 54 91 51 
2002 162 97 149 95 
2003 190 103 159 91 
2004 166 94 137 84 
2005 163 97 144 89 
2006 122 79 92 65 
2007 198 102 183 96 
2008 138 85 123 80 
 
With totals for enforcement actions against domestic issuers and foreign 
private issuers, it is possible to use the total number of foreign and domestic 
issuers on U.S. markets to compare enforcement rates. Table 10 presents the 
key findings, which show a disparity in the number of foreign and domestic 
issuers affected by SEC enforcement. Although enforcement rates may be 
considered low for all types of issuers, foreign private issuers have been 
punished less frequently for violations of disclosure and reporting rules. 
Relative to U.S. issuers, not only are foreign private issuers subject to more lax 
reporting requirements, they also face a more forgiving—or perhaps unaware 
or otherwise occupied—enforcement agency. Thus, while the bonding 
hypothesis would suggest that crosslisted issuers are rewarded for committing 
to the U.S. governance regime, the results in this Note suggest that such 
issuers may not be committing to the governance regime of U.S. firms but to a 
separate ‘second tier’ regime for foreign issuers. 
 
 
127.  For purposes of this analysis, “domestic issuers” includes all issuers other than those that are 
both listed on the IRR lists and that file FPI disclosure materials. All other issuers are 
included in the domestic category. 
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excluding enforcement 















2000 0.00% 0.58% 0.00% 0.54% 
2001 0.00% 0.57% 0.00% 0.54% 
2002 0.08% 1.05% 0.00% 1.03% 
2003 0.16% 1.16% 0.16% 1.03% 
2004 0.32% 1.08% 0.32% 0.97% 
2005 0.32% 1.16% 0.32% 1.06% 
2006 0.35% 0.97% 0.26% 0.80% 
2007 0.19% 1.33% 0.19% 1.25% 
2008 0.68% 1.21% 0.68% 1.14% 
 
Table 11 compares the percentage of SEC enforcement actions for 
disclosure violations that target foreign private issuers with the percentage of 
listed firms that are foreign issuers registered and reporting with the SEC. 
Once again, the results show a noteworthy difference in the percentage of U.S. 
listed issuers and registered foreign issuers, and the percentage of enforcement 
actions that target foreign private issuers. Although results from recent years 
suggest a convergence in enforcement and listing rates, such convergence  
post-dates the development of the bonding hypothesis and cannot explain the 
early findings of a bonding premium. 
 
 
128.  To compute these rates, I divide the number of actions (either against FPIs or domestic 
issuers) identified in Tables 8 and 9 by the total number of domestic and foreign registered 
and reporting companies listed in Table 7. If the ballpark estimate of 12,000 total issuers 
provided by Paul Dudek is used, then the Percent of Domestic Issuers Targeted (Including 
Enforcement Against Aiders and Auditors) would be 0.54% , 0.51%, 0.91%, 0.96%, 0.87%, 
0.90%, 0.73%, 0.93%, 0.77%. Similarly, if, instead of using the number of registered and 
reporting companies, the IRR number is adjusted downward by 13% to account for the 
subset of issuers discussed in note 99 above, then the Percent of FPIs Targeted (Including 
Enforcement Against Aiders and Auditors) would be 0.00%, 0.00%, 0.09%, 0.19%, 0.37%, 
0.37%, 0.40%, 0.22%, 0.79%. 
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target fpis  







2000 11.54% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2001 12.36% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2002 12.54% 0.61% 1.02% 0.00% 0.00% 
2003 12.21% 2.06% 1.90% 1.85% 2.15% 
2004 12.48% 3.49% 4.08% 4.20% 4.55% 
2005 12.86% 8.94% 3.96% 4.64% 4.30% 
2006 12.30% 8.96% 4.82% 5.15% 4.41% 
2007 12.09% 5.71% 1.92% 1.61% 2.04% 
2008 12.69% 8.00% 7.61% 8.89% 8.05% 
C. Delinquent Issuer Enforcement: A Comparison of Enforcement Rates 
Having analyzed the enforcement rates for Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 
violations, I turn to Delinquent Filings, the second most ‘active’ enforcement 
category for foreign issuers. The analysis below relies on both parts of my 
empirical methodology. In particular, Table 12 presents not only the total 
number of enforcement actions brought by the SEC each year, but also the 
total number of defendants targeted by such actions. Although the SEC 
releases the total number of defendants for each type of enforcement action, the 
count is most relevant for Delinquent Filing cases. Whereas other types of 
enforcement actions tend to revolve around one company and a set of 
individuals responsible for some wrongdoing involving that company, in 
recent years, actions for Delinquent Filing cases have been brought against 
several companies at once. That is, one enforcement action often revokes the 
registration for several companies. Therefore, the total number of defendants, 
rather than the total number of enforcement actions, provides the better 
estimate of the number of companies affected by the SEC’s enforcement 
division. Using the totals for Delinquent Filer enforcement actions from the 
analysis in Part III, I assume that the number of domestic issuers affected is the 
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number of defendants reported by the SEC minus the number of actions 
against foreign issuers in a given year. Next, using the market information 
presented in Table 7, I calculate the enforcement rates for domestic and foreign 
issuers. As with Issuer Reporting and Disclosure, Table 12 below reveals a 
disparity in the enforcement rates for domestic and foreign issuers. 
 
Table 12. 

































2000 8 9 0 0.00% 0.09% 
2001 14 15 0 0.00% 0.16% 
2002 10 11 0 0.00% 0.12% 
2003 11 25 0 0.00% 0.28% 
2004 21 57 1 0.08% 0.64% 
2005 60 126 1 0.08% 1.49% 
2006 91 169 6 0.52% 2.00% 
2007 53 184 2 0.19% 2.37% 
2008 111 479 15 1.46% 6.59% 
D. FCPA Enforcement Trends 
No analysis of public regulation of foreign issuers could be complete 
without a discussion of the recent—and highly publicized—effort to enforce 
the FCPA.131 Passed in the aftermath of corporate and political corruption 
scandals in the 1970s, the Act requires issuers that register their securities with 
the SEC to keep detailed books, records, and accounts that accurately record 
 
129.  To calculate these percentages, I use the number of foreign registered and reporting 
companies in Table 7, supra.  
130.  To calculate these percentages, I use the number of domestic companies in Table 7, supra.  
131.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494. 
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corporate payments and transactions. Such companies are also required to have 
a system of internal accounting controls to ensure that corporate assets are 
properly overseen. The antibribery provisions of the Act make it unlawful for a 
“United States citizen, national or resident,” and certain foreign issuers, to 
make a corrupt payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or 
retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person. 
As Table 13 and Table 14 show, in just the last few years, the SEC and DOJ 
have turned to the FCPA to go after some of the biggest and most high-profile 
multinational companies, including a number of foreign issuers crosslisted in 
the United States. For example, the SEC has initiated more than thirty FCPA 
actions since the beginning of 2006, “which is more than were filed during the 
prior 28 years combined.”132 
 
Table 13. 







2002 1 2 
2003 0 0 
2004 3 2 
2005 7 1 
2006 3 4 
2007 18 7 
2008 8 10 
 
 
132.  RAYMUND WONG & PATRICK CONROY, FCPA SETTLEMENTS: IT’S A SMALL WORLD AFTER ALL 
2 (2009), available at http://www.nera.com/image/Pub_FCPA_Settlements_0109 
_Final2.pdf [hereinafter NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING] (quoting Linda Chatman 
Thomsen, Director of Enforcement, SEC). 
133.  Data in this chart are drawn from SHEARMAN & STERLING, 2009 REPORT, supra note 109, at 
ii. 
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foreign registered and reporting issuers with sec enforcement 




incorporation listing market 
2004 ABB Ltd.  Switzerland  NYSE 
2006 Statoil ASA  Norway  NYSE 
2007 Akzo Nobel N.V.  Netherlands  NMS 
2007 Alcatel-Lucent  France  NYSE 
2008 
Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft  Germany  NYSE 
2008 Fiat S.p.A. Italy  NYSE 
2008 CNH Global N.V. Netherlands  NYSE 
 
Today’s FCPA enforcement actions are distinguishable in several ways 
from the traditional SEC enforcement fare. First, they entail active 
participation and leadership by the Department of Justice, which considers the 
FCPA “[o]ne of the Department’s most potent weapons in combating foreign 
corruption.”134 The DOJ is responsible for all criminal enforcement and for civil 
enforcement of the antibribery provisions with respect to domestic concerns as 
well as foreign companies and nationals.135 As the Department itself notes, 
since 2001, it has increased its focus on FCPA violations.136 “In 2007, the DOJ 
brought sixteen enforcement actions, compared to four in 2002.”137 
Prosecutions of individuals have also increased. In 2007, for example, DOJ’s 
enforcement efforts resulted in the indictments or guilty pleas of eight 
individuals.138 
Second, batches of investigations of FCPA violations have stemmed from 
single sources of information, such as the Iraq Oil-for-Food program.139 Using 
 
134.  U.S. Department of Justice, Fact Sheet: The Department of Justice Public Corruption 
Efforts, Mar. 27, 2008, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/March/08_ag 
_246.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2009). 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. 
138.  Id. 
139.  SHEARMAN & STERLING, LLP, FCOA DIGEST OF CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING TO 
BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977, at iii 
(2008) [hereinafter SHEARMAN & STERLING, 2008 REPORT]. 
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this information, the DOJ and SEC have launched several consolidated 
investigations involving the activities of multiple companies in multiple 
jurisdictions. Increasingly, companies are also self-reporting violations in order 
to avoid the harsh penalties imposed by U.S. authorities. 
The third distinguishing characteristic of FCPA cases is the sheer 
magnitude of penalties imposed. For example, “[s]ince January 2006, the 
Commission [alone] has ordered the payment of more than $200 million in 
penalties, disgorgement, and prejudgment interest for FCPA violations.”140 
FCPA enforcement made headlines when Siemens AG, Europe’s largest 
engineering company, after pleading guilty to violating the internal controls 
and books and records provisions of the FCPA,141 agreed to pay a criminal fine 
of $450 million in the DOJ settlement and $350 million in disgorgement of 
profits under its agreement with the SEC.142 Finally, as in the Siemens case, 
FCPA investigations have increasingly involved parallel investigations and 
prosecutions in foreign jurisdictions.143 In the case of Siemens, the company 
agreed to pay €395 million (about $569 million) to settle the case in Germany, 
“on top of the €201 million it paid in October 2007 to settle a related action 
brought by the Munich Public Prosecutor.”144 
The evidence suggests that the SEC and DOJ are likely to continue their 
focus on FCPA violations. Table 15 shows that there are at least twelve foreign 
registered and reporting issuers with pending FCPA investigations. The 
number of pending investigations is significant but not surprising. FCPA cases 
allow the SEC to make highly-publicized examples out of foreign issuers. 
 
140.  NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, supra note 132, at 2. 
141.  “Siemens paid kickbacks to win contracts for transportation in Venezuela, mobile-telephone 
networks in Bangladesh, power plants in Israel and traffic-control systems in Russia, 
according to prosecutors. The company allegedly paid $1.36 billion in bribes to government 
officials worldwide and concealed them using off-book accounts . . . .” Sheenagh Matthews, 
Siemens Rises as Size of Bribery Fine Brings Relief, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 15, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=aHEQY.E66b9w&refer 
=germany. 
142.  SEC, Litigation Release No. 20829, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/ 
lr20829.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2009). According to the Wall Street Journal, “The $800 
million in U.S. fines for bribery allegations levied against Siemens AG on Monday could 
have been much higher if [the firm] hadn’t taken steps to cooperate with prosecutors.” 
David Crawford & Mike Esterl, Siemens Pays Record Fine in Probe, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 
2008, at B2. 
143.  For example, the following countries have been investigating the Siemens case: China, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Liechtenstein, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, and Switzerland. 
SHEARMAN & STERLING, 2008 REPORT, supra note 139, at vii. 
144.  Cassin Law LLC, Final Settlements For Siemens, The FCPA Blog, Dec. 16, 2008, 
http://fcpablog.blogspot.com/2008/12/final-settlements-for-siemens.html. 
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Because many of the cases stem from a single source (such as the Iraq  
Oil-for-Food program), they are also easier to identify. Moreover, because 
there is international support for the FCPA, the SEC has been able to leverage 
the cooperation of foreign regulators. Finally, the domestic costs are shared 
between the DOJ and SEC, with both agencies reaping the benefits of 
successful, high-profile enforcement actions. For all of these reasons, both U.S. 
and foreign public enforcement agencies are likely to continue targeting FCPA 
violations, a fact that could result in greater cooperation and coordination 
among securities regulators around the world. 
 
Table 15. 
international registered and reporting companies with pending fcpa 
investigations145 
 
issuer name country of incorporation 
ABB Ltd. Switzerland 
Alcatel Lucent France 
AstraZeneca PLC United Kingdom 
DaimlerChrysler AG Germany 
Fiat SpA  Italy 
GlaxoSmithKline plc United Kingdom 
Norsk Hydro ASA  Norway 
Novo Nordisk A/S Denmark 
Petro-Canada Canada 
Royal Dutch Shell plc United Kingdom 
Smith & Nephew PLC United Kingdom 
Total SA  France 
 
While increased FCPA enforcement has affected foreign private issuers, it is 
questionable whether the prosecution of bribery by company officials supports 
the bonding hypothesis. Though it is plausible that the listing premium and 
lower cost of capital enjoyed by crosslisted firms could be explained by the 
firms’ implicit promise not to cheat or mislead investors (by virtue of 
crosslisting in the United States), it is less clear that investors would place a 
greater value on firms that were prohibited from engaging in potentially 
profitable business practices. Thus, although FCPA prosecutions have led the 
 
145.  SHEARMAN & STERLING, 2009 REPORT, supra note 109, at 238-306. 
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SEC to focus more on foreign firms, the enforcement actions for FCPA 
violations do not directly address the concerns of investors and thus do not 
directly support the bonding hypothesis. Still, given their growing prominence 
on the SEC enforcement agenda, the pattern and potential of FCPA 
investigations merit continued observation and analysis. 
v. private enforcement against foreign issuers 
Having shown the relative weakness of public enforcement against foreign 
private issuers, I turn to the trends in private enforcement. It is important to 
recall that proponents of the bonding hypothesis view private enforcement as 
one of the mechanisms that allows foreign issuers to credibly commit to 
elements of the U.S. disclosure and governance regimes. Coffee has specifically 
pointed to “effective and low-cost legal remedies, such as class actions and 
derivative actions, that are simply not available in the firm’s home 
jurisdiction”146 but that are available in the United States. In line with Litvak’s 
recent work questioning the role of private enforcement,147 in this Section, I 
consider the viability of private enforcement as an alternative to public 
enforcement and as the potential source of the bonding premium. I note that, 
although the reach of private enforcement against foreign issuers is currently 
uncertain, case law through 2009 has limited the exposure of foreign firms to 
U.S. litigation, further increasing the disparity in enforcement for domestic 
and foreign issuers. At the same time, contrary to the assumptions of the 
bonding hypothesis, the class action mechanism is no longer an exclusive 
feature of the U.S. securities regulation regime. Several countries have adopted 
procedural mechanisms that are similar to the U.S. class action in important 
respects, enabling foreign issuers to obtain certain benefits of private 
enforcement on non-U.S. markets. 
A. Class-Action Trends in the United States 
Although public enforcement in the United States does generate more 
enforcement outputs than its counterparts abroad, the United States is truly an 
“extraordinary outlier” when one takes into account private enforcement.148 For 
example, between 2000 and 2002, while SEC monetary sanctions totaled 
 
146.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Crosslistings and Stock Market 
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1780 (2002). 
147.  Litvak, supra note 8, at 8. 
148.  Coffee, supra note 21, at 267. 
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$801,333,333, private class action settlements totaled $1,906,333,333.149 In 2006, 
SEC sanctions totaled $3.275 billion, while private class action settlements 
reached 17 billion dollars.150 But how do these aggregate trends break down for 
domestic and foreign issuers? Are foreign issuers targeted by private plaintiffs? 
Are they as likely to succeed in U.S. courts? Can private enforcement serve as a 
substitute for public enforcement in the bonding hypothesis? 
In this section, I examine the extent of private enforcement against foreign 
firms, with a particular focus on litigation in U.S. courts by foreign purchasers 
of foreign companies’ securities. Notably, private enforcement against foreign 
issuers has grown roughly in proportion to the growth in crosslisting.151 In 
1996, only 7.1% of companies listed on U.S. exchanges were foreign, while 
8.3% of federal filings targeted non-U.S. issuers. By 2007, the percentage of 
foreign companies on U.S. exchanges had increased to 14.8% while the percent 
of filings against non-U.S. issuers had reached 13.9%.152 Of all the cases filed 
against foreign issuers, about 40% were so-called foreign cubed or f-cubed 
cases, with forty-five foreign cubed claims filed between 1996 and 2005. Of 
those, at least thirty-two were against foreign issuers registered and reporting 
with the SEC.153 
Foreign cubed class actions involve foreign purchasers of a foreign 
company’s stock on a foreign exchange trying to bring class action lawsuits in 
the United States. From the bonding perspective, such cases are important 
because crosslisted firms typically sell a relatively small amount of equity in the 
United States, with the majority of shares sold on home markets. If class 
actions can only be brought by investors who purchased stock in the United 
States, then the number of private enforcers of U.S. securities law is very 
limited. Similarly, if a crosslisted firm cannot be prosecuted for fraud devised 
or committed outside the United States—or if it can be held liable only to the 
 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. 
151.  Note that “foreign” or “non-U.S. issuers” in this Section does not necessarily comply with 
the technical SEC definition of foreign private issuer. A foreign or non-U.S. issuer, as used 
here, is any company that is not incorporated in the United States. 
152.  STEPHANIE PLANCHICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: 2009 MID-YEAR UPDATE 9 (2009) [hereinafter NERA REPORT]. 
153.  Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing 
Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 39 (2007). To determine the number 
of claims against foreign registered and reporting companies, I used the SEC lists of 
International Registered and Reporting Companies for 2000-2008, supra note 94, to check 
whether each foreign target on Buxbaum’s list was also on the SEC lists. 
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extent that U.S. investors were affected by such fraud—then the bonding 
impact of crosslisting is likely to be minimal.154 
Historically, foreign-cubed plaintiffs have had mixed results in U.S. courts, 
with judges making case-by-case determinations about the existence of subject 
matter jurisdiction and the likelihood of issue preclusion in the foreign 
plaintiffs’ home countries. Of those forty-five cases against foreign issuers 
between 1996 and 2005, foreign plaintiffs were included in fifteen classes and 
excluded from sixteen.155 For example, in the 2007 case again Vivendi, a French 
company whose common stock traded largely on European exchanges, the 
court certified a plaintiff class that included purchasers from France, England, 
and the Netherlands but excluded German and Austrian plaintiffs.156 The court 
reasoned that because a significant number of the alleged misleading 
statements were made to analysts and investors in New York, there was a 
sufficiently strong U.S. nexus to trigger U.S. jurisdiction. But while France, 
England, and the Netherlands would likely enforce a U.S. judgment, the court 
found that there was too much doubt about whether German and Austrian 
courts would respect a U.S. judgment. 
The mixed results stem from the fact-intensive analysis required by the 
courts. To bring their suits in U.S. courts, foreigners who purchased a foreign 
company’s stock on a foreign exchange must overcome two hurdles. The first is 
to establish subject matter jurisdiction over their claims. The second is to 
convince the court that their home country will recognize the judgment of a 
U.S. class action and that there will be issue preclusion such that defendants 
will not be targeted again in a different jurisdiction.157 The antifraud provisions 
of the federal securities laws do not speak directly to the scope of their 
application in the international context. In order to show the existence of 
subject matter jurisdiction, foreign investors must pass at least one of the two 
jurisdictional tests developed by the federal courts. In general, courts have 
required the claimant to show that there was conduct in the United States that 
 
154.  This prediction is supported by Litvak’s recent findings that a litigation-based bonding 
theory cannot explain the difference in premia based on US trading volume. Litvak, supra 
note 8, at 8. Ignoring f-cubed litigation, Litvak posits that “[f]irms’ exposure to US 
securities lawsuits is correlated with the level of US trading, because available damages in a 
typical ‘10b-5’ lawsuit, based on misdisclosure, are proportional to the losses suffered by US 
investors, which in turn are proportional to US trading volume.” Id. at 8. 
155.  Buxbaum, supra note 153, at 39-40. The remainder of the cases involved an alternative 
resolution without a ruling on the inclusion or exclusion of foreign plaintiffs. Id. a 409. 
156.  In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 242 F.R.D. 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
157.  Buxbaum, supra note 153, at 31. 
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“directly caused the foreigners’ losses” and that “such conduct was more than 
‘merely preparatory’ to a securities fraud conducted elsewhere.”158 
If foreign plaintiffs are able to establish subject matter jurisdiction, the 
second hurdle is to establish the superiority of the class action by showing that 
any judgment or settlement reached in the class action will have a preclusive 
effect.159 This showing is important because a class action defendant must have 
the assurance that after a settlement in the United States, members of the 
plaintiff class will not later be able to lodge the same claims again in another 
forum. In the case of foreign plaintiffs, the U.S. court must ascertain whether 
the foreign plaintiff’s home jurisdiction would recognize a U.S. judgment in 
the case. The degree of certainty required, however, varies across jurisdictions. 
Historically, some courts have required “near certainty” while others only the 
“possibility” of recognition.160 
More recently, courts in the United States have become “increasingly 
reluctant” to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over securities claims against 
foreign-domiciled companies brought by foreign claimants who bought their 
shares on foreign exchanges.161 Courts have increasingly expressed concern 
about the implications of a “fraud on the global market” theory, whereby an 
investor from any part of the world could claim reliance on actions of 
defendants in the United States. In the recent class action against AstraZeneca, 
a U.K. company, where ninety percent of the class consisted of foreigners who 
had bought the defendant’s shares on foreign exchanges, Judge Thomas Griesa 
of United States District Court for the Southern District of New York noted 
that other courts had rejected the global fraud-on-the-market theory, out of 
concern that it would “extend the jurisdictional reach of the United States 
securities laws too far.”162 
At the same time, the reluctance to certify f-cubed classes has stemmed at 
least in part from the growing availability of class action mechanisms outside 
the United States. In two recent cases, for example, the courts displayed 
impressive coordination and cooperation with foreign courts by rejecting the 
 
158.  In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 2004 WL 2375830 at 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
159.  Buxbaum, supra note 153, at 31. 
160.  Id. at 33-34. 
161.  Kevin LaCroix, Watch Out World, Incoming U.S. Securities Litigation, THE D & O DIARY,  
June 12, 2008, http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/06/articles/securities-litigation/watch-out 
-world-incoming-us-securities-litigation/. 
162.  In re AstraZeneca Sec. Litig., 559 F. Supp. 2d 453, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Kevin 
LaCroix, Another Court Restricts Foreign Claimants’ Access, THE D & O DIARY, June 9, 2008, 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/06/articles/securities-litigation/another-court-restricts 
-foreign-claimants-access/. 
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claims of f-cubed plaintiffs after their claims were resolved in Dutch 
settlements.163 The Dutch settlement specifically required a U.S. court ruling 
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of non-U.S. 
purchasers, thus ensuring that all future f-cubed claims against the company 
would be precluded. 
In October 2008, after numerous conflicting opinions in the district courts, 
the Second Circuit finally ruled on an f-cubed case. In Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd.,164 the court found that “the fact that the fraudulent 
statements at issue emanated from [the issuer’s] corporate headquarters in 
Australia, the complete lack of any effect on America or Americans, and the 
lengthy chain of causation between [the U.S. subsidiary’s] actions and the 
statements that reached investors—add up to a determination that we lack 
subject matter jurisdiction.”165 Although the court resisted creating any kind of 
bright-line rule against f-cubed plaintiffs, it denied the foreign plaintiffs the 
chance to have their claims heard in the United States.166 
The court acknowledged the “parade of horribles” that the defendants and 
their amici claimed would result from accepting an f-cubed case.167 In 
particular, the defendants contended that f-cubed cases would “undermine the 
competitive and effective operation of American securities markets, discourage 
cross-border economic activity, and cause duplicative litigation.”168 Most 
importantly, the defendants claimed that permitting f-cubed cases to go 
forward would “bring [U.S.] securities laws into conflict with those of other 
jurisdictions,” where class actions are either not available or there is some 
question as to whether a class action would preclude further litigation.169 The 
 
163.  In 2007, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, a defendant in an f-cubed case in a district 
court in New Jersey, took the fight to the Netherlands. Under a 2005 Dutch law that allows 
the Amsterdam Court of Appeals to accept a collective resolution of a dispute even in the 
absence of a lawsuit, Shell reached an agreement to settle all claims by non-U.S. purchasers 
of Shell stock. The settlement specifically required—and was contingent on—the U.S. 
district court ruling that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of non-
U.S. purchasers. Then in May 2008, SCOR Holdings reached an agreement to settle the 
claims of the certified class before a U.S. court and the claims of non-U.S. purchasers in a 
simultaneous proceeding in the Netherlands. See Blair Connelly et al., The Shell Court’s 
Exclusion of Non-U.S. Purchasers, ENERGY L. 360, Dec. 6, 2007. 
164.  547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2009) (No.  
08-1191). 
165.  Morrison, 547 F.3d at 177. 
166.  Id. 
167.  Id. at 174. 
168.  Id. 
169.  Id. 
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defendants cited, and the court repeated, sources on the subject that may not 
reflect recent trends.170 As I discuss in the next Section, much has changed 
since 2001 and the last eight years have seen a shift toward the development of 
class action mechanisms around the world. 
In the end, the Second Circuit, while refusing to adopt the bright-line ban 
against f-cubed plaintiffs advocated by the defendants, nevertheless concluded 
that it was “an American court, not the world’s court,” and, as such, it could 
not “and should not expend [its] resources resolving cases that do not affect 
Americans or involve fraud emanating from America.”171 Although it left in 
place the traditional subject matter jurisdiction tests, by ruling that Morrison 
did not meet those tests, the court precluded similar f-cubed cases, including 
cases where some portion of the fraud had occurred in the United States. 
Commentators labeled the decision a “significant victory for foreign 
companies” and noted that the “factual pattern [in Morrison] is typical of many 
cases that have been brought against foreign issuers.”172 In essence then, the 
Second Circuit, where most securities class actions are filed,173 has hampered 
future f-cubed litigation. 
At press time, Morrison was pending resolution in the U.S. Supreme 
Court;174 the U.S. government has taken the position that the private right of 
action under section 10(b) should “be tailored so as to minimize the likelihood 
of . . . international friction.”175 Meanwhile, another court of appeals has 
responded to the decision and made its own, fact-intensive decision in a 
foreign-cubed case. In In re CP Ships Ltd. Securities Litigation 176 the Eleventh 
Circuit panel applied the conduct and effects tests and concluded that the case 
 
170.  Id. (citing David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All?, 52 EMORY L.J. 417, 
423 (2003); Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 369, 372 (2001)). 
171.  Id. at 175. 
172.  George T. Conway & Lauryn P. Gouldin, Second Circuit’s Decision in National Australia Bank 
Is Significant Victory for Foreign Companies, SECURITIES DOCKET, Dec. 3, 2008, 
http://www.securitiesdocket.com/2008/12/03/guest-column-second-circuit%E2%80%99s 
-decision-in-national-australia-bank-is-significant-victory-for-foreign-companies/. 
173.  NERA REPORT, supra note 152, at 3. 
174.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Morrison, No. 08-1191 (U.S. Mar. 23, 2009). 
175.  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15, Morrison, No. 08-1191. Despite the fact 
that the SEC had filed an amicus brief in the Second Circuit in favor of the plaintiffs, the 
joint amicus brief argues that the Supreme Court should deny cert. Interestingly, the brief 
does so even after claiming that courts have used an incorrect approach to analyze f-cubed 
cases and after acknowledging the existence of disagreements between circuit courts. 
176.  578 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2009). 
SHNITSER_PRESS_V2WEB.DOC 5/28/2010 6:02:50 PM 
the yale law journal 119:1638  2010  
1690 
 
was “very different” from Morrison.177 The court found the distinction in the 
fact that whereas the “the problematic numbers” in Morrison may have 
originated in the United States, all of the executives with responsibility for 
presenting accurate information to the public were in Australia, as were all 
their actions in supervising and verifying such information.178 In contrast, the 
“manipulation and falsification of the numbers” in the CP Ships case took place 
in Florida, and the executives with responsibility for the accuracy of data 
operated from Florida.179 Based on this fact pattern, the Eleventh Circuit 
determined that the district court had properly exercised jurisdiction over 
foreign-cubed plaintiffs. The decision suggests that in the absence of a clear 
rule or policy,180 f-cubed plaintiffs’ access to U.S. courts will depend heavily on 
the particular factual details of the case and the particular court’s judgment 
about the sufficiency of such facts to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. 
Thus, the extent of private enforcement against crosslisted firms and its 
viability as a substitute for weak public enforcement will remain uncertain until 
a brighter line decision is reached. 
B. Class Action Trends Abroad 
Although U.S. securities litigation in general, and f-cubed cases in 
particular, have been widely criticized, if U.S. public enforcement against 
foreign issuers is very limited, then either the bonding hypothesis is false (or 
operates in a manner not previously emphasized by scholars) or private 
enforcement in the United States must explain, at least in part, the bonding 
premium enjoyed by firms crosslisted on U.S. markets. However, as this 
section shows, in recent years, it has become possible for investors to seek 
private enforcement outside the United States, thus potentially undermining 
the value of bonding to the U.S. regime. In other words, if the bonding 
premium is explained at least in part by the strength and uniqueness of U.S. 
private (rather than public) enforcement, then the growing availability of 
 
177.  Id. at 1316. 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id. 
180.  The December 2009 House Financial Reform bill includes a provision that would mandate 
that federal court jurisdiction for securities cases include cases that involve “conduct within 
the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the 
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors” 
or “conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect 
within the United States.” H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7216 (2009). 
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private enforcement abroad may give issuers alternative markets where similar 
bonding through private enforcement may be achieved. 
Within the past several years, a number of countries—including Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, England, and Wales—have 
adopted procedural mechanisms that are similar to the U.S. class action in 
important respects.181 While no other nation has embraced the U.S. model in 
all respects, many have embraced key aspects of the U.S.-style class action. 
Foreign investors all over the world have become “more accustomed to the idea 
that aggrieved shareholders are entitled to hold company management 
accountable.”182 Foreign investors injured by company misdealing but unable 
to join class action lawsuits in the United States have been agitating for similar 
mechanisms in their own countries. 
The Australian system for investor class actions, for example, resembles the 
form of securities class actions in the United States.183 The Australian model 
permits class actions to be brought by representative plaintiffs based on 
standards that are similar to those under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
(although no formal motion for class certification is required). Class members 
are considered bound by any judgment unless they opt out.184 However, unlike 
in the United States, the availability of the fraud-on-the-market presumption 
of reliance remains an open question and Australia does not provide for jury 
trials of securities claims.185 Australia follows the loser pays rule on fee shifting. 
Australian law also prohibits contingent fee arrangements, but it does permit 
“no win - no fee” lawyer arrangements.186 Recent reports have chronicled the 
“surge” in class actions in Australia, with “little doubt” that there will be more 
class actions in coming years.187 
 
181.  John J. Clarke, Jr. & Keara M. Gordon, Global Realm of Securities Class Actions, N.Y.L.J., May 
19, 2008, at S4. 
182.  Kevin LaCroix, Foreign Companies, Foreign Claimants, U.S. Courts, THE D & O DIARY, Oct. 15, 
2007, http://www.dandodiary.com/2007/10/articles/international-d-o/foreign-companies 
-foreign-claimants-us-courts/print.html. 
183.  Clarke & Gordon, supra note 181, at S5. 
184.  VINCE MORABITO, GROUP LITIGATION IN AUSTRALIA - “DESPERATELY SEEKING” EFFECTIVE 
CLASS ACTION REGIMES 44 (2007), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/ 
images/dynamic/events_media/Australia_National_Report.pdf. 
185.  For an explanation of the fraud-on-the-market theory in the United States, see Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
186.  MORABITO, supra note 184, at 53. 
187.  Adele Ferguson, Lessons To Learn in Class Actions, THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 2, 2009, at 15.  
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In Canada, the Ontario Securities Act has provided investors with a private 
right of action allowing them to recover damages based on false or misleading 
statements included in primary market disclosures such as a prospectus, an 
offering memorandum or a takeover proposal circular.188 In 2006, the Ontario 
Securities Act was extended to allow private suits for misrepresentations in the 
secondary market, but the statute caps damages in these actions at the greater 
of $1 million or five percent of an issuer’s market capitalization.189 The statute 
is also structured to deter strike suits, a perceived abuse of the American 
system, by requiring court approval before an action can be commenced and 
expressly providing for fee shifting.190 In 2009, in a groundbreaking ruling 
against IMAX Corp., an Ontario judge in a securities class action certified a 
global class that includes eighty to eighty-five percent of IMAX shareholders 
who reside outside Canada, some of whom had purchased their shares on the 
NASDAQ.191 The judge rejected the defendant’s arguments to exclude non-
Canadian plaintiffs, citing the fact that in the U.S. proceedings against the 
same issuer, defendants had argued against global certification and had urged 
for the superiority of the Canadian class action.192 
The above examples, which represent only a small fraction of the growing 
class action mechanisms around the world, suggest that the U.S. private 
enforcement system may no longer be the exception. That is, even if U.S. 
private enforcement has contributed to the bonding premium by giving both 
domestic and foreign investors a way to keep issuers accountable, its value in 
the future is likely to decrease as other countries make the class-action 
mechanism more widely available and less susceptible to the shortcomings of 
U.S.-style securities class actions. 
conclusion 
At a time when important parts of the U.S. system of financial regulation 
are being restructured, this Note highlights some of the untested assumptions 
about the status quo. Contrary to widely held beliefs and academic 
 
188.  Clarke & Gordon, supra note 181. 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Silver v. IMAX Corp., No. Civ-06-3257-00 (Ont. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2009) (Can.), available 
at http://www.oakbridgeins.com/clients/blog/imaxleave.pdf. 
192.  Kevin LaCroix, In Landmark Rulings, Ontario Court Allows IMAX Securities Suit to Proceed, 
Certifies Class, THE D&O DIARY, Dec. 28, 2009, http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/12/ 
articles/securities-litigation/in-landmark-rulings-ontario-court-allows-imax-securities-suit 
-to-proceed-certifies-class/. 
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assumptions, the empirical evidence shows that, particularly at the very 
beginning of the twenty-first century, and at the time the bonding hypothesis 
was developed, the SEC gave foreign issuers a free pass. Between 2000 and 
2008, it brought enforcement actions against them at a rate lower than the rate 
for domestic issuers and focused either on high-profile, hard to miss FCPA 
cases or low-profile, easy to enforce infractions. 
Private enforcement against foreign issuers, arguably a substitute for public 
enforcement in the bonding hypothesis, has also been limited by concerns 
about conflicts with other jurisdictions. Barring enforcement from foreign 
regulators, fraud committed abroad against foreign investors has likely gone 
unpunished. Indeed, while investors from certain countries have been able to 
pursue damages in class action lawsuits in the United States, other investors 
have been denied access to private remedies. As the Supreme Court decides the 
limits of private enforcement against foreign issuers, the future of this 
enforcement mechanism remains uncertain. 
The empirical findings in this paper suggest that additional research is 
needed to understand what draws foreign issuers to U.S. markets and how 
perceptions may differ from reality. If, for the purposes of understanding 
enforcement, the key comparison is not between U.S. enforcement rates for 
domestic and foreign issuers, but rather between home-country and U.S. 
enforcement rates, then additional empirical research is necessary to explore 
the existence and magnitude of such differences. Alternatively, if firms crosslist 
in the United States not for bonding but for other purposes, then the 
limitations on public and private enforcement may matter less, and more 
scholarly and policymaker attention should be devoted to understanding the 
other aspects of U.S. markets that make them attractive for foreign issuers. 
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